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Tying the Spirit's Wings
I have read the article by
Paul Gregory Alms entitled
"Where is Jesus?" (Advent/
Christmas 2008) and would
like to comment. When I was
about sixteen, I recognized that,
though I loved being in church,
loved every aspect of corporate
worship, I was empty inside.
This is similar to what Rev.
Alms found , except in reverse
order. Because I knew I didn't
know God, I went on to look
for Jesus in every way I could.
It was one reason I transferred
to Valpo-to find God. I heard
from Him at Valpo. In the dorm
room. By myself. For three
days I walked on air, a promise
of wonderful things to come.
I want to say that John 3:6-8
is not a comment on corporate
worship. We do not stop with
celebrating in church; we begin
there. We do what every faith
ful individual, from Nicodemus
to Paul to Martin Luther, had to
do. We seek Jesus individually
until He finds us.
I hope that Rev. Alms will
not be content with the "shared
experience of church," and that
he doesn't so restrict his flock,
since I know that if the people
he's sharing with in church
haven't made contact with
Jesus individually, the corporate experience is restricted, the
Holy Spirit must do what He
4 I5
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can with His wings tied behind
His back.

Anita Born
Westford, New York

Paul Gregory Alms replies:
Thank you for the thoughtful response to my essay. As I
reflect on your comments, I am
struck by two things. First is the
joy you obviously find in your
relationship with Jesus. How
wonderful that is! There are
many variations to our personal
relationships with Jesus our
Savior. Yours and mine intersect
and diverge in several ways, as
you pointed out. The joy you
find in an intensely personal,
individual experience, I find
in sharing a common liturgical
service with fellow Christians.
The two are equally personal
and individual. It is not the case
that my joy is not somehow real
or meaningful for being corporate. I experience the liturgy as
an individual. It is meaningful
to me and emotional, yet it happens in a group setting. That
setting enriches the inner benefit, the joy, I derive from it. I find
my own inner satisfaction precisely in that corporate setting.
The second thing that occurs
to me is that we ought to be
careful when we speak of finding God. God promises to gives

himself in certain ways, according to the Scriptures, in Word,
proclamation, and sacraments.
In these divine avenues, we can
be sure we are in contact with
the Holy Spirit. Of course, God
can do whatever he wishes and
reveal himself in whatever way
he wishes. He is God, after all.
But we find certainty and an
anchor for our faith in seeking him in the places where
he himself has promised to
be (Word, baptism, supper).
It is these promises that have
come to mean so much to me.
The objectivity and strength
in reaching outside of my own
weak frail psyche to something
that is solid and beyond my
own doing is a joy that, paradoxically, I feel deep inside
myself. That these promises
are fulfilled and experienced
in a group setting, in a community of people just as weak and
fallen as myself, is a blessing.
One aspect of the church which
is part and parcel of the Gospel,
I believe, is the community, the
communion, we share in Christ.
God has created us to be sharers of ourselves with others,
and in the church that design
of God, lost in sin, begins to be
restored. 'f

in luce tua
What's Justice Got to Do with Beauty?

W

HAT

MAKES

SOMETIIING

BEAUTIFUL?

Everyone has their own favorite objects
or places of beauty. I see beauty in the
softness of sunlight as it flows through the morning
mist and reflects over the still waters of a lake. And
I hear beauty when I listen to the counterpoint of
interwoven melodies in a J. S. Bach cantata.
I can't explain why I find either of these things
to be beautiful, but there is no question that I do. It
seems to me that the beauty of a sunrise must come
from its natural purity and intensity. And a fugue
is beautiful because of its balance and symmetry.
But if they are beautiful for such different reasons,
does it make sense to use the same word to describe
both experiences? Do they share something real,
some single natural characteristic that makes them
beautiful? We have been asking these kinds of questions for centuries. In Western civilization, they go
back all the way to the pre-Socratics-at least to
Pythagoras who thought beauty was a reflection of
proper mathematical proportion.
Some insist that beauty is entirely in the eye
of the beholder-that there is no natural standard
of beauty. In this line of thinking, the experience of
beauty is completely subjective, probably no more
than a bio-chemical response deep within our brains
to various external stimuli. But this sort of thinking
fails to explain how most of us experience beauty.
For example, there are certain experiences-flavors,
aromas, pictures, etc-that I like and enjoy, but that
aren't appealing to my family and friends. This difference of opinion doesn't bother me. To each their
own. On the other hand, when I think something is
truly beautiful, I expect others will think so too. If
they don't, I might even take offense. When we perceive an object as beautiful, we feel a sort of obligation to it and expect others to as well. Unlike other
kinds of pleasurable experiences, beauty draws us
toward something outside of ourselves. When we

see a beautiful natural vista, we feel obliged to preserve it from development. When we see the beauty
in a child's face, we are filled with compassion and
love and want to protect that child from any harm.
And that raises the question, "Beauty. What's
Justice Got to Do with It?" This question was the
theme of the eighteenth annual national conference of the Lilly Fellows Program in Humanities
and the Arts, held at Seattle Pacific University in
Seattle, Washington, on 10-12 October 2008, and the
essays in this issue were originally presented as lectures to plenary sessions of that conference. We are
able to bring these issues as well as this issue of The
Cresset to you through the generous support of the
Lilly Fellows Program. In "Beauty and Justice," philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff considers whether a
refined sense of beauty contributes to a heightened
concern for social justice, and he recognizes that-in
many cases-it does not. In her essay "Beauty and
Truth," Christine Chaney presents beauty in works
of art as a form of truth-telling that goes beyond what
can be communicated through the written word.
Finally, Benita Wolters-Fredlund, in "Experiencing
Beauty in the Music of the Holocaust" shows that it
is possible to find beauty even in the midst of one of
the greatest injustices ever perpetrated.
Together, these essays help us recognize that
our experiences of beauty are more than moments
of isolated, selfish pleasure. Beauty serves as a
reminder of something that is noble and deserves
to be remembered, as a means of communicating a
kind of truth for which words are inadequate, and as
an expression of human dignity in the direst of circumstances. We cannot help but perceive the beauty
permeating the world that God has created, but we
must ask ourselves if we will always respond to that
beauty with the justice that it demands. f
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Beauty and Justice

Nicholas Wolterstorff

I

N HER BOOK ON BEAuiY AND BEING JusT (PRINCETON

1999), Elaine Scarry notes that there has been
a widespread banishing of beauty from the
humanities in recent decades, and that this "has
been carried out by a set of political complaints
against" beauty (57). In Part Two of the book, she
responds to these complaints. "Beauty," she says, "is
at the very least innocent of the charges against it,
and it may even be the case that far from damaging our capacity to attend to problems of injustice,
it instead intensifies the pressure we feel to repair
existing injuries" (57). As Scarry sees it,

[T]he political critique of beauty is composed of two distinct arguments. The first
urges that beauty, by preoccupying our
attention, distracts attention from wrong
social arrangements. It makes us inattentive, and therefore eventually indifferent, to
the project of bringing about arrangements
that are just. The second argument holds
that when we stare at something beautiful,
make it an object of sustained regard, our
act is destructive to the object. This argument is most often prompted when the
gaze is directed toward a human face or
form ... (58)
About these two arguments, she makes the acute
observation that whatever merit each has in and of
itself, "they are unlikely both to be true since they
fundamentally contradict one another. The first
assumes that if our 'gaze' could just be coaxed over
in one direction and made to latch onto a specific
object (an injustice in need of remedy or repair),
that object would benefit from our generous attention. The second assumes that generous attention
is inconceivable, and that any object receiving sustained attention will somehow suffer from the act of
human regard" (58-9).

Scarry doesn't say much about the second argument. Her attention is focused on the first; so mine
will be as well. But before we get to that, let me say
a word about the second argument.
I would state the argument rather differently
from how Scarry states it. Her formulation of the
argument is that when we stare at something beautiful, our act is destructive to the object. I think the
argument is best understood as having two prongs:
one prong pertaining to human beings and one to
other things.
As it pertains to human beings, the argument is
not, I think, that our gaze is destructive of the human
being at whom the gaze is directed but that it wrongs
him or her. And the examples that most powerfully
make the point are not those in which our gaze is
directed at someone beautiful- though no doubt
we do sometimes wrong a beautiful person by staring at him or her-but those in which, often with
the aid of a photographer, we subject a human
being who is not beautiful to an aestheticizing gaze.
The photographs by Diane Arbus, of human beings
malformed in various ways, are an example of the
point. I think a serious case can be made that these
people have been wronged by the combination of
Arbus photographing them and you and I now gazing with aesthetic intent at them in the photographs.
Speaking for myself, I would strongly dislike being
the subject of an Arbus photograph!
The other prong of the argument pertains to
those cases in which the aestheticizing gaze finds
beauty in trash-photographs taken from a half
mile up of a city dump, photographs taken from
close-up of peeling paint on a door in a ghetto. Not
infrequently, photographs of dumps taken from a
distance or of a rotted door from close up are things
of beauty. No more than in the first case is the aestheticizing gaze destructive of the object, but neither,
in this case, does it wrong the object. What merits

concern is rather that the aestheticizing gaze conceals from us the ugliness, conceals from us the fact
that this dump is a besmirching of the earth by the
human beings whose detritus this is, conceals from
us the fact that the ghetto is a place of squalor. In
short, I think that Scarry mis-formulates the second
argument and thereby blunts its considerable force .
That said, however, I want to focus on her
response to the first argument, which says that
attention to beauty distracts us from wrong social
arrangements. Her claim is that beauty, rather than
distracting us from justice, "assists us in our attention to justice" (86).
Her defense of this claim is threefold:
She argues that there is a deep analogy
between the nature of beauty and the
nature of justice.
She argues that there is a deep similarity
between our response to beauty and our
response to justice.
She argues that there is an equivalence
between the concern that there shall be
beauty in the world and the commitment
to justice.
These analogies, similarities, and equivalences have
the consequence, so she says, that attention to beauty
evokes in us attention to the need for justice.
Begin with the analogy between the nature of
beauty and the nature of justice. Beauty, as Scarry
understands it, is grounded in symmetry, or as she
often calls it, equality. Justice, so she says, is likewise
constituted of symmetry or equality. She regards the
phrase, "a symmetry of everyone's relation to one
another" (95) as descriptive of both beauty and justice. In the course of discussing this analogy, Scarry
claims the existence of two other analogies in the
region. She insists that attention to one instance of
beauty exerts on the beholder a pressure to treat
other instances of beauty with equal regard, equal
treatment being a feature of justice. Beautiful things,
she says, "give rise to the notion of distribution"
(95). And she holds that what she calls "the generous availability to sensory perception" of beauty
(110) has an analogy in the equal distribution that
constitutes justice. Putting these three analogies
8 I9

The Cresset

Easter I 2009

together, Scarry says that the "pressure" of beauty
toward justice "comes from the object's symmetry,
from the corrective pressure it exerts against lateral
disregard, and from its own generous availability to
sensory perception" (110).
As to the similarity between our response to
beauty and our response to justice, Scarry remarks
that "at the moment we see something beautiful,
we undergo a radical decentering" (111). "All the
space formerly in the service of protecting, guarding, advancing the self (or its 'prestige') is now free
to be in the service of something else" (113). Scarry
doesn't actually complete the argument by claiming that attention to justice and injustice is likewise
decentering, but clearly that is what she has in
mind.
And as to the equivalence between the concern
that there shall be beauty in the world and the commitment to justice, Scarry observes, first, that the former concern is manifested both when one "acts to
protect or perpetuate a fragment of beauty already
in the world" and when one acts "instead to supplement it by bringing into being a new object" (114).
And she then observes that these "two distinguishable forms of creating beauty-perpetuating beauty
that already exists; originating beauty that does not
yet exist- have equivalence within the realm of justice, as one can hear in John Rawls's formulation of
what, since the time of Socrates, has been known
as the 'duty to justice' argument: we have a duty,
says Rawls, 'to support' just arrangements where
they already exist and to help bring them into being
where they are 'not yet established"' (115). (Scarry
takes note of a second "feature shared by the kind
of creation we undertake on behalf of beauty and
the kind of creation we undertake on behalf of justice" (115). This second feature is somewhat more
complex than the first; explaining it would not contribute significantly to the reader's understanding
of Scarry's line of thought.)

S

O WHAT SHALL WE SAY ABOUT THESE LINES OF

argument for the conclusion that "beauty,
far from contributing to social injustice... or
even remaining neutral to injustice as an innocent
bystander, actually assists us in the work of addressing injustice" (62)? Let me first observe that what
we have here is yet one more re-statement of classic
Romantic claims concerning the power of art. With

due allowance for the fact that Romanticism is by no
blances, attending to beauty does not have the inhermeans a sharply defined category of classification, it
ent power of energizing the beholder to struggle for
can fairly be said that the Romantics were the first to
justice. Beauty does not have the inherent salvific
power that Scarry and her Romantic predecessors
sense that, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, there had emerged in Europe a quite new form
claim for it. We have all known people who were
of society and culture, call it modernity, and that they
intensely attentive to beauty but cared not a fig for
were also the first to claim that the essence of what
justice; we have all heard about horrible people who
was new was that modernity fractured old unities,
live in large elegant houses and work in elegant
this fracturing being driven mainly by the relentless
offices. Historians tell us that a good many of the
Germans who supervised the concentration camps
and pervasive application of rationality. In his long
poem Lamia, John Keats said of the new natural sciduring the day attended concerts in the evening and
expanded their art collections with paintings plunence that it "unweaves the rainbow." The Romantics
believed that modernity
dered from the occupied
countries. And let us not forin general unweaves the
rainbow.
get that many of the artifacts
Attending to beauty does not
whose beauty now mesmerArt is the exception;
have
the
inherent
power
of
us were created on the
izes
the Romantics regarded
backs of indentured labor.
art as the great social
energizing the beholder
other. The artist employs
Scarry nowhere takes note
to struggle for justice. Beauty
imagination rather than
of this obvious objection to
rationality, and the work
her thesis, that attending to
does not have the inherent
of art is not a collecbeauty has the inherent saltion of fragments but an
salvific power that Scarry
vific power of energizing us
organic unity. This social
to pursue justice. I have no
and her Roman tic
otherness of art led the
idea why she does not take
Romantics to ascribe salnote
of it.
predecessors claim for it.
vific power to art. Poetry,
Just now, I used the
someone once remarked
phrase "inherent salvific
to me, "knits together
power" a couple of times.
the tattered fragments of our existence." When it
The claims made by Scarry and her Romantic predecessors concerning the salvific power of attending
came to explaining how exactly this salvific power
works, the Romantics were always hazy. Somehow
to beauty and art are claims concerning its inherent
or other, engagement with art will energize us to
power. It is those claims that I contest on the ground
mend the world.
that they are patently false. Not for a moment do I
Nothing that Scarry says suggests that she sees
deny that now and then, here and there, attention to
herself as standing in the line of the Romantics. But
art and beauty does energize us to seek justice. But
the telltale signs are all there. Injustice is disunity,
to understand why this is, we have to get down into
the trenches. We have to uncover what it is about
inequality, asymmetry; beauty is unity, equality,
symmetry. Art is thus the social other. And attenparticular works and particular types of works that
tion to beauty will awake us to the injustice surgives them this potential and what it is about parrounding us and energize us to struggle against
ticular viewers and particular types of viewers that
this injustice, until society resembles beauty in its
actualizes this potential. We will discover nothing if
unity, equality, and symmetry. Beauty will save us,
we remain at the ethereal level of discussing what is
if we attend to it.
inherently the case.
Later I will be saying something about the analogies, similarities, and equivalences that Scarry proArt and the Memory of Injustices
fesses to find between beauty and justice. Here let
Let me now get down into those trenches for a
me just observe that even if there are those resemwhile. Let me call attention to two roles art plays that

sometimes energize the struggle for justice. And let
me now re-configure the discussion, so that henceforth it is primarily about art and justice rather than
about beauty and justice. My description of each of
these roles will be brief-only enough for you to
get the idea. Each could be elaborated in an essay,
indeed, in a book.
No doubt some people struggle for justice out
of a sense of duty; perhaps all of us do some of the
time. And some people struggle for justice because
this is what good and virtuous people do. But if my
own experience is any indication, in most people
these motivations tend to be weak unless undergirded and reinforced by a quite different motivator, namely, compassion. The Samaritan was moved
by compassion when he saw the mugged man lying
at the side of the road; that's what led him to come
to his aid.
And what evokes compassion? Perhaps cornpassion is evoked in some people by calm and dispassionate newspaper reports of sorneone's plight.
Possibly this is true for most of us some of the time.
But once again, if my own experience is any indication, what mainly evokes compassion for some person or group of persons is having that person in his
predicament, or those persons in their predicament,
brought vividly before one. This vivid presentation
may take the form of their actually being present
to one, so that one sees their faces and hears their
voices. Alternatively, it may take the form of seeing
vivid photographs or films of them. Or it may take
the form of their being made vivid to one by imaginative literature.
By the early 1970s, I knew a good deal from
newspaper reports about the plight under apartheid
of the so-called blacks and coloreds in South Africa,
but it was when I attended a conference in South
Africa in 1976, and carne face to face with blacks and
coloreds, that I was moved by compassion to speak
and work for their liberation. In the early 1970s, I
also knew a good deal from newspaper reports
about the plight of the Palestinians, but it was when
I carne face to face with Palestinians at a conference
in 1978 that I was moved by compassion to speak
and work for their liberation.
In these two cases, it was compassion evoked
by face-to-face meetings that energized me to work
for justice. But the point I want to make here is that
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visual representations and imaginative literature
also sometimes evoke compassion in us for those
who are wronged and thereby energize us to struggle for justice.
Over the past several years I have made a point
of asking people who teach nineteenth-century
American literature whether they ever include
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom 's Cabin in their
course. I have yet to meet anyone who did. The reason, I'm sure, is that Uncle Tom's Cabin doesn't measure up to our current aesthetic standards; it doesn't
have enough of the beauty that Scarry talks about.
Yet the novel was, so I am told by historians, extraordinarily influential in the abolitionist movement. It
is easy to see why: it made the plight of the slaves
vivid to the reader. I read Uncle Tom 's Cabin on my
own when I was a young teenager. To this day I
remember how my heart bled for Uncle Torn and
how angry I was at his tormenter, Simon Legree.
Let me move on to a second role that art plays
whereby it sometimes energizes us to struggle for
justice. "Remember Sharpeville" was a cry that
echoed for decades in the South African liberation
movement. Why so? "Sharpeville" was the name of
a village in which the South African police mowed
down a large number of blacks who were peacefully
protesting against their oppression; the year, as I
recall, was 1960. The reason the cry was kept alive
is that fundamental to the success of a liberation
movement is keeping alive outrage over the injustices being protested, and one way to do that, in tum,
is to keep alive the memory of the most egregious
examples of those injustices. I must add at once that
cries to remember-cries such as "Remember the
Battle of the Boyne," "Remember the Alamo," and
"Remember Sharpeville" - can also serve to keep
alive the memory of perceived injustice rather than
real injustice, and to serve the cause of vengeance
rather than the cause of justice.
To speak more generally: we human beings
find it important to keep alive the memory of some
person or event from the past-so as to honor that
person or event, so as to keep outrage alive, and so
forth. But we are forgetful. So we make things and
do things as a memorial; we name the capital city
"Washington" so as to honor and keep alive the
memory of George Washington; we commission
a Lincoln Memorial so as to honor and keep alive

the memory of Abraham Lincoln; we paint nativity
We could discuss other roles art plays that
scenes so as to honor and keep alive the memory of
sometimes energize the struggle for justice and
the birth of Jesus, and so forth, on and on. And as my
roles it plays that sometimes obstruct the struggle
for justice. But enough has been said to make my
examples indicate, art is caught up in this activity of
making and doing as a memorial. Many of the things
point: attentiveness to art does not inherently enerthat are made or done as a memorial are works of
gize the struggle for justice. It is rather particular
art, and conversely, many works of art are made or
roles art plays that sometimes, not always, energize
done as a memorial. They are memorial art. It is a
the struggle for justice.
role of art that has been almost entirely neglected by
the tradition of modem aesthetics, but just a bit of
The Intrinsic Value of Art
reflection will make clear that it is, in fact, one of the
Let me return to the topic of analogies, similarities, and equivalences-not now between beauty and
most important and pervasive of all the roles that
art plays in our lives.
justice, however, but between
And now for the point:
art and justice. I have argued
works of memorial art often
that even if there is resemWorks of memorial art
serve to keep alive the memblance, the evidence is clear
often serve to keep alive
that attentiveness to art does
ory of outrageous breaches
of justice; often in doing so
not inherently enhance attenthe memory of outrageous
they energize the struggle
tiveness to justice-and just
breaches
of
justice.
Often
in
against present and future
as clear, let me add, that atteninjustice. A work that comes
tiveness to justice does not
doing so they energize the
to mind immediately here is
inherently enhance attentivestruggle against present
Picasso's famous painting,
ness to art. Nonetheless there
Guernica. Another that comes
is, in my view, a fundamental
and future injustice.
to my mind is the sequence of
similarity between the two
poems by the contemporary
and taking note of it deepens
Irish poet, Micheal O'Siadhail,
our understanding. Let me
entitled The Gossamer Wall: Poems in Witness to the
begin with art and take up justice second.
Holocaust.
In the spring of2007, the distinguished American
poet, Donald Hall, paid a visit to the University of
Destruction turns all their presence into absence
Virginia. He read some of his own poetry to a large
unless some testimony breaks their infinite silence.
audience and conducted a small closed seminar
In remembrance resides the secret of our redempabout writing poetry, to which I was invited. In the
tion. (112)
seminar he often illustrated the point he was makAnd here are just a few more lines:
ing by referring to changes he had made in some of
his own poems between first draft and final version.
Neat millions of pairs of abandoned shoes
I remember one of those changes. In an earlier draft
Creased with mute presence of those whose
of one of his poems, he had spoken of a dog wagFaces both stare and vanish ....
ging its tail; he changed that to the dog swinging its
Friedlander, Berenstein Menasche, Blum.
tail. A student asked why he made that change. He
Each someone's fondled face. A named few.
answered, "Because it made it a better poem." Those
Did they hold hands the moment they knew?
were his exact words.
(122)
Those words have the tone of a brush-off. But
Poetry about the Holocaust poses in extreme form
the remark came near the end of a two-hour session,
the danger I discussed earlier, of aestheticizing the
and by then I had discerned enough of Hall's charhorror and thereby wronging the victims. O'Siadhail
acter to know with a surety that he was not giving
is acutely aware of the danger. To my mind, he sucthe student a brush-off. He meant no more and no
ceeds admirably in overcoming it.
less than what he said. He changed the line because

the change made it a better poem. He didn't explain
why the change made it a better poem, and no one
asked.
Upon returning home from Hall's seminar,
I looked up a passage I had known for some time
that was written in 1785 by the German author, Karl
Philipp Moritz. My previous response to the passage had been a blend of annoyance and bafflement.
The passage goes like this:
In the contemplation of the beautiful
object... I contemplate ... something which is
completed, not in me, but in its own self, which
therefore constitutes a whole in itself, and
affords me pleasure for its own sake.
While the beautiful draws our attention
exclusively to itself... we seem to lose ourselves in the beautiful object; and precisely
this loss, this forgetfulness of self, is the highest degree of pure and disinterested pleasure that beauty grants us. In that moment
we sacrifice our individual being to a kind
of higher being .... Beauty in a work of art is
not pure ... until I contemplate it as something that has been brought forth entirely
for its own sake, in order that it should be
something complete in itself. (Abram 1986)
What had annoyed me in this passage was the suggestion that works of art belong to a higher kind of
being than human beings. I don't accept that. What
had baffled me was Moritz's obliviousness to the fact
that while declaiming that a work of art is brought
forth entirely for its own sake, he was assuming that
works of art exist for the pleasure to be experienced
in contemplating them.
In the light of Hall's comment, the passage now
looked quite different. I was still annoyed with the
suggestion that works of art are of greater worth
than human beings. But now I wondered: was I perhaps wrong in thinking that Moritz was assuming
that works of art are instrumental to the pleasure to
be experienced in contemplating them? Was he perhaps saying that works of art have intrinsic, that is,
non-instrumental, worth? Notice that Hall's answer
to the student's question was not that he changed
the line because he thought his audience would get
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greater pleasure from the revision. He changed it
because the change made it a better poem.
I FOUND HALL'S REMARK SO STRIKING
is that it awoke me from a dogmatic slumber.
Let me explain. Every articulate theory of
the modem or contemporary period concerning the
worth of works of art with which I am acquainted
is an instrumentalist theory: the worth of works of
art resides in some effect they have on us when we
attend to them. There are brief passages, such as that
from Moritz, that point in another direction. But
every developed, articulated theory that I know of is
an instrumentalist theory. Works of art do not have
intrinsic worth. Their worth lies in causing something that is of intrinsic worth. The "something"
that is of intrinsic worth is an experience of a certain kind, coupled, perhaps, with certain effects of
that experience. The deepest disagreements among
modem theories of artistic worth are disagreements
over the nature of that experience.
The emotivist tradition, represented preeminently by Tolstoy and Collingwood, insists that
the intrinsically valuable experience which imparts
worth to works of art is an emotion of a certain sort,
or perhaps a certain range of emotions. The alethic
tradition (from the Greek for "truth," "aletheia"), of
which Hegel, Heidegger, Adorno, and Marcusse
are prominent representatives, insists that the fundamental worth of works of art is located in their
giving us knowledge of certain sorts. And the aestheticist tradition, represented by many writers,
Kant and Monroe Beardsley prominent among
them, holds that the worth-imparting experience is
what has come to be called the aesthetic experience.
These three traditions do not cover all the positions
that have been set forth, but they are, I would say,
the main traditions.
I now think they are all mistaken. Of course it is
true that works of art often have instrumental worth.
Just a few minutes ago, I was arguing that works of
art sometimes energize the struggle for justice, but
I now think that in addition to such instrumental
worth, often works of art also have intrinsic worth.
Let me develop the point by approaching it,
as Hall did, from the side of the artist who makes
the art rather than from the side of the public who
engages the art. And for no very good reason, let

T

HE REASON

that's one of the principal requirements or paramme formulate what I have to say in terms of music
eters he has set for himself. Naturally, he also wants
rather than poetry. The application to the other arts
it to be playable, so he will keep in mind the powers
of the points that I make will be obvious.
and limitations of the modem piano and the abiliI am not a composer. When it comes to making
ties of skilled performers. And he hopes that it will
art, I have done no more than dabble a bit in archiget performed, and that when it is performed, there
tecture. So I stand to be corrected in what I say by
will be an audience that finds it rewarding to listen
those who are composers, but it appears to me that
to. But here is my question: does the composer make
at the heart of the activity of composing are three
his evaluations and choices by reference to what he
constituent activities: imagining sound patterns,
expects will give greater satisfaction to anticipated
evaluating the sound patterns imagined, and choosaudiences? Does he say to himself that passage A
ing from among the sound patterns imagined on
is likely to give greater satisthe basis of those evaluations.
faction to audiences than pasWorks of music, so I suggest,
sage B, so I'll go with A?
are traces of imagining, evaluIt is true that works of art
I feel sure that he does
ating, and choosing. Or to use
very little of this- those of you
a different metaphor: works of
often have instrumental
who are composers will have
music are imagination, evaluworth. But I now think
to tell me if I am wrong- if
ation, and choice embedded in
for no other reason than that
sound.
that in addition to such
the pleasure of audiences is
Let me say just a word
instrumental
worth,
often
so fickle and unpredictable. I
about the imagination that
suggest
that, for the most part,
goes into musical composiworks of art also have
he evaluates and chooses as
tion. This is not wild and
intrinsic
worth.
he does because he wants to
unfettered imagination; it is
compose a good sonata. He
not whatever some wanderchooses this sound-pattern
ing muse happens to whisover that one because he
per in the composer's ear. It is
thinks it makes for a better sonata. Sometimes he
both schooled and guided. In calling it schooled I mean
may be able to identify what it is about this soundthat the composer's imagining of sound-patterns is
pattern that makes it better than that one, and often
shaped by the sound-patterns he has previously
he will not be able to do so. He senses that it is better
heard, including especially the sound-patterns of
but isn't able to say why.
works of music he has heard. Bach did not imagAnd now for the conclusion of the argument:
ine sound-patterns like those in Stravinsky's Rite
when the composer evaluates sound-pattern A as
of Spring but discard them on the grounds that he
making for a better sonata than sound-pattern B,
was waiting for something better to come to mind.
and accordingly chooses A over B as part of his
He never imagined such sound-patterns-or it is
finished sonata, he is making a judgment of nonextremely unlikely that he did. In calling it guided
instrumental intrinsic worth. He is not making his
I mean that the composer usually will not just sit
evaluation and choice by reference to which of the
down to compose music but will have requirements
or parameters that he wants to satisfy. He wants to
two options will bring about more aesthetic pleacompose a piano sonata, he wants to compose a
sure. He's not making it by reference to anything at
all that he expects it to bring about.
song to fit the words of some poem that moves him,
and so forth. And in good measure, his imagination
From this it follows that works of art have
will follow this guidance. I find it both wonderful
intrinsic worth. I'm not happy with calling that
and mysterious that our human imagination can be
intrinsic worth beauty. The traditional understandguided in this way.
ing of beauty connects beauty with pleasure. In
Let's move on to evaluation and choice. Suppose
Aquinas's classic formulation, beauty is that which
the composer has resolved to write a piano sonatagives pleasure upon being perceived. The intrinsic

worth of works of art has nothing directly to do
with pleasure, but if some want to call it beauty, I
won't object.
One last point here. If what I have said about
works of music having intrinsic non-instrumental
worth is correct, then the next question to ask is, how
should we think of the relation between the worth of
works of music and the activity of attentively listening to those works? If we reject the instrumentalist
view of artistic worth, which holds, in the aestheticist version, that it is the worth of the pleasurable
experience of attentive listening that gives worth to
the work, then how should we think instead?
If the work of music itself has intrinsic worth,
then the core value of attentive listening to the work
does not consist in the satisfaction one experiences in
such listening; it consists in the worth of becoming
perceptually aware of something of intrinsic worth
and of perceptually recognizing that in it which is of
intrinsic worth. The worth of the activity of attentive
listening is derived from the worth of the work. Of
course, we are not innately capable of perceptually
recognizing the intrinsic worth of works of art; we
have to acquire what the eighteenth-century writers
called "taste."
Justice and the Intrinsic Worth of Human Beings
Now for the other member of the similarity-pair,
justice. On this occasion, my presentation of what I
understand justice to be will have to be dogmatic,
I won't be able to defend my understanding. I do
defend it at length in my recently published book,
Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton 2008).
I hold that justice is constituted of enjoying
rights; a society is just insofar as its members enjoy
what they have a right to. And I hold that rights,
in turn, are normative social relationships; sociality
is built into the essence of rights. A right is always
a right with respect to someone. For the most part,
those normative bonds of oneself to the other are not
generated by any exercise of will on one's part. The
bond is there already, antecedent to one's will, binding oneself and the other together. The other comes
into my presence already standing in this normative
bond tome.
Of course there are other sorts of normative
bonds than rights. So what sort of normative bond
is a right? Well, for the other to have to me the nor-
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mative bond of a right is for her to have a legitimate
claim on me as to how I treat her- a legitimate claim
to my doing certain things to her and a legitimate
claim to my refraining from doing other things. If
I fail to do the former things, I violate the bond; if I
do not refrain from doing the latter things, I likewise
violate the bond. I do not break the normative bond;
that still holds. She continues to have that legitimate
claim on me as to how I treat her. I violate the bond.
The legitimate claim of the other on me as to
how I treat her is a legitimate claim to the good of my
treating her a certain way-this good of my treating
her a certain way being, of course, a good in her life,
a life-good, something that enhances her well-being.
If a student writes a first-rate paper in a course that I
am teaching, she has a right to the good of my giving
her an A-that being a good in her life, a life-good,
something that enhances her well-being. A common
saying in present-day political liberalism is that
"the right has priority over the good." In the order
of concepts it is the other way around: the good has
priority over the right. A right is a legitimate claim
to the life-good of being treated a certain way.
The converse does not hold: there are many
ways of being treated by others that would be goods
in one's life but to which one does not have a right.
I think it would be a great good in my life if someone would offer me one of the classic Frank Lloyd
Wright houses for my living quarters. Sad to say, I
don't have a right to that good.
What accounts for the fact that someone has a
right to the good of my treating her a certain way,
rather than it just being a good thing for me to do?
That's the big question that any theory of rights has
to address. My own view is that what accounts for
it is her worth, her dignity. Specifically, the rights of
the other against me are actions and restraints from
action on my part that due respect for her worth
requires of me. To fail to treat her as she has a right
to my treating her is to demean her, to treat her
with disrespect, to treat her as if she had less worth
than she does. To spy on her for prurient reasons,
for example, or to insult her, to torture her, to badmouth her, to do any of these things to her is to treat
her in a way that does not befit her worth.
And to treat her in a way that does not befit
her worth is to wrong her. If I fail to treat her in the
way that she has a right to my treating her, she is

wronged. My moral condition is that of being guilty;
her moral condition is that of being wronged. Just as
guilt is the dark side of duty, so being wronged is
the dark side of rights.
I'm sure you now see where this is going, so I
can be brief. I don't accept most of the analogies that
Scarry professes to see between beauty and justice.
For example, symmetry is not necessary and sufficient for beauty, nor is justice to be identified with
equality or symmetry. But on this occasion I don't
have time to argue these points. Let me instead simply observe that works of art have intrinsic worth
and that human beings have intrinsic worth. When
we engage in engrossed contemplation of some
worthwhile work of art, we dwell on something of
intrinsic worth and on that in it which is of intrinsic worth. When we treat some human being justly,
treat her as she has a right to be treated, we treat
her in a way that befits her worth. Engaging in the
engrossed contemplation of some work of art and
treating some human being justly are two modes
of acknowledging worth, two modes of acknowledging excellence. By virtue of being two modes of
acknowledging the worth of something other than
oneself, both are inherently decentering. On this
point, Scarry was correct.
I can now re-phrase one of the points made earlier, a sad feature of our human condition is that a
person can be deeply committed to one of these two
ways of acknowledging worth and indifferent to the
other way.
LLOW ME TO MAKE ONE FINAL POINT, THIS time
not about the relation of art to justice but
about the relation of beauty, or aesthetic
excellence, to justice. It is easy for those involved in
service organizations to fall into the trap of thinking that to be a human being is to be a food-eater, a
clothes-wearer, and a house-dweller. After all, more
often than not the people one is dealing with are
people who don't have enough to eat, people who
don't have adequate clothes, and people whose
housing is squalid or non-existent. Food, clothing,

A

and housing are urgent. Justice requires that we
give them priority.
But when one stands back to reflect, it is clear
that to be human is more, much more, than this. To
be human is to be a creature who is treated with disrespect if he or she is deprived of education. To be
human is to be a creature who is treated with disrespect if he or she is not allowed, to a considerable
extent, to set her own course of life rather than having someone else set it for her. And to be human,
so I suggest, is to be a creature who is treated with
disrespect if he or she is forced to live in aesthetic
squalor. When social arrangements force some of
our fellow human beings to live in poverty, they
are wronged, treated unjustly. It is just as true that
when social arrangements force some of our fellow human beings to live in aesthetic squalor, they
are wronged, treated unjustly. Living in aesthetic
decency is not an optional luxury but a moral right.
Justice requires it. f
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Beauty and Truth

Christine Chaney
NE OF 1HE GREAIFSr NoBEL PRIZE ACCEPTANCE
speeches ever given was made by
Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1972. In that
speech Solzhenitsyn reflected on a comment made
by Fyodor Dostoevsky.

O

Dostoevsky once let drop an enigmatic
remark: "Beauty will save the world." What
is this? For a long time it seemed to me simply a phrase. How could this be possible?
When in the bloodthirsty process of history did beauty ever save anyone, and from
what? Granted, it ennobled, it elevatedbut whom did it ever save?
There is, however, a particular feature
in the very essence of beauty-a characteristic trait of art itself: the persuasiveness
of a true work of art is completely irrefutable; it prevails even over a resisting heart.
A political speech, an aggressive piece of
journalism, a program for the organization
of society, a philosophical system, can all be
constructed-with apparent smoothness
and harmony-on an error or a lie ... .A true
work of art carries its verification within
itself: artificial and forced concepts do
not survive their trial by images .. . [rather]
works which have drawn on the truth and
which have presented it to us in concentrated and vibrant form seize us, attract
us to themselves powerfully, and no one
ever-even centuries later-will step forth
to deny them.
I'd like to take up this claim inherent in both
Solzhenitsyn's and Dostoevsky's words-that
''beauty can save the world." In doing so, I want to
set aside any worries that I might be arguing for the
Romantic view ofbeauty that lands perhaps too com-
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pletely in the ideal realm. Instead, I must take up the
challenge of the "truth" problem or "alethic" argument (always so compelling to academics!)-that is,
art "as a way of knowing." Surely that is a question
or problem that must be taken up more thoroughly
in a talk entitled "Beauty and Truth." And while I
agree that we've got some very well-worn grooves
here in the philosophical and epistemological frameworks we've erected around discussions of beauty
and knowing-surely we aren't simply locked into
rehearsing the same old eighteenth and nineteenth
century arguments, either.
Rather, as a narrative theorist in literaturea philosopher of story and interpretation, if you
will-l'd like to take up Solzhenitsyn's two statements that "the persuasiveness of a true work of art
is completely irrefutable; it prevails even over a
resisting heart"-and- "A true work of art carries
its verification within itself." In each of these claims,
Solzhenitsyn takes as given the fact that art contains
within itself the constituent elements of its own dialogue-indeed its own argument (by the language
of both "persuasiveness" and "verification").
This is not a position unique to Solzhenitsyn
but it does seem to be particularly compelling to
Russian thinkers and believers-an idea I will investigate further in just a moment. For now, though, it is
important to note that in this definition, beauty is not
self-enclosed but always in relationship. Therefore,
I want to offer my central claim that "beauty" is the
term best used to characterize what it is that brings
about "persuasiveness" and "verification" - indeed,
that very notion of "truth-telling in a work of art."
"Beauty," in this formulation, is the term for the
discursiveness outside of words that exists in any
beautiful thing.
It wasn't only Jacques Derrida-although he
famously gets the credit-who noticed, back in the
old twentieth century, that the entire foundation of

western epistemology has been erected on the slippery foundation of human language. As far back as
Edmund Saussure in the nineteenth, of course, the
dangerous territory of linguistic instability had set
off alarms. And nothing seems to be more problematic than trying to talk about truth in beauty with so
wobbly a tool- words being so alarmingly multivalent. But we humans rely so heavily on languageindeed it is our species's distinctive gift. And God
himself spoke to us in "the Word made flesh," of
course. How then do we find our way out of these
thickets?

L

ET ME MAKE AN ATTEMPT BY FIRST TELLING YOU

about something beautiful I saw one day.
The first time I visited London was in 1994
when I was a graduate student to give a paper at a
conference. Of course, who could resist the lure of
the British Museum and all that problematic imperialism and compulsive collectivity on display -especially for a scholar of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries?
As I walked around the very large room that
reproduces the Parthenon Frieze (or "Elgin Marbles"
in the Victorian terminology) at a height suitable
for viewing, I was particularly struck by both the
incredible beauty of the sculpted marble and the
powerfully life-like figures that proceeded around
the hall- but also by the compelling narrative that
starts to emerge as you walk with all the people
and animals in each marble section. A viewer has
the mesmerizing sense of being part of the parade
as the figures seem to move alongside you as you
walk the hall.
Suddenly, one jarringly different scenario
stopped me in my tracks-this hilarious scene of a
recalcitrant bull and the two guys desperately trying to keep him in line. You can practically hear the
animal bellowing. I paused in my walk along the
procession and read that little white explanatory
note below the figures. It says:
Figure 117 quickens his step and turns
sharply. A youth leading the animal also
turns while the beast itself raises its head to
bellow. This slab is thought to have inspired
Keats to write of "that heifer lowing at the
skies in his Ode on a Grecian Urn."

You could have just knocked me over with a feather
at that moment.
Of course, every English major worth his or
her salt knows that famous poem backwards and
forwards. What hit me then was that I was standing literally on the exact same piece of flooring that
had stopped Keats, too. The beauty-and humanity-of this ancient sculpture has "intrinsic worth,"
as it were, that has lasted through the ages, but
what interested me was that it was still speaking.
The incredible- and even cliched- fame of both
these marbles and that Romantic poem did nothing to silence the conversation that we two were
able to have that morning in September 1994. And
I hasten to add that this claim does not foreground

Who are these coming to the sacrifice?
To what green altar, 0 mysterious priest,
Lead'st thou that heifer lowing at the skies,
And all her silken flanks with garlands drest?
-john Keats

the Marbles' "instrumental" worth in making me
"experience" its beauty (or recall the poem), either.
Rather, it was an encounter rooted only-and temporarily-in the short instance of space and time
when that object and myself met and "mutually
completed each other," to quote another Russian
philosopher.
But look again at that famous last stanza of
Keats's poem.

0 Attic shape! fair attitude! with brede
Of marble men and maidens overwrought,
With forest branches and the trodden weed;
Thou, silent form! dost tease us out of thought
As doth eternity: Cold Pastoral!
When old age shall this generation waste,
Thou shalt remain, in midst of other woe
Than ours, a friend to man, to whom thou
say'st,
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty,-that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know."
"Beauty is truth, truth beauty" -in disputed quotation marks, no less (since scholars aren't totally sure
if Keats or his first printer put them in)-implying
that someone is actually speaking these lines, correct? But who? The urn? The poem's speaker? And
is that "all ye know on earth" and, even further, "all
ye need to know"? And who exactly is this "ye"? We
who stand and see? The reader of the poem? Anyone
who comes close and listens? The longer you look
the less clear that statement seems. The editors of
the Norton Anthology of English Literature go so far as
to say in a footnote that the famous phrase is either
"a profound metaphysical proposition, an overstatement representing the limited point of view of
the urn, or simply nonsensical" (8th ed., 906).
In fact, I believe that this powerful yet ultimately
mystifying moment in poetry-reading makes one
thing clear-while beauty makes us notice our own
attempts to understand it, it also evades the rational certainty, the "finalizing" of any kind of fixed
reference in language. As we see, the poet's words
here finally fail to capture the ultimate "meaning"
of truth and beauty in a rational or epistemological
way; they collapse into their own jumbled system
of reference. Indeed, Keats, like me, was stopped
right in his tracks, jolted by the marble's beauty
into a moment both inside and outside of time and
stunned with a sense of our shared humanity across
the ages by the "discursiveness without words" of a
humorous moment with a boy and a bull. But it is,
in fact, the poetic lines before these that seem to me
to be the actual point here. The comforting incarnate
presence-and even love-of the beautiful thing
itself will continue to be always in relationship outside of itself: "Thou shalt remain, in midst of other
woe(fhan ours, a friend to man ... "
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So I want to tum back to my central claim that
"beauty" is the term best used to describe that artistic "persuasiveness" and "verification" -indeed,
that "truth-telling-of the discursiveness outside
of words that exists in any beautiful thing. As with
the Hebrew notion of the God who is not named,
the "not-said" of the holy word "YAHWEH" carries within it all the divine meaning of the One
True God. It is not silence or absence-it is the
"not-said" that is all-encompassing and divine
PRESENCE.
What is central to my argument here, then, is a
re-framing of "truth" into a much broader conception of "telling." Mikhail Bakhtin has written that
the representative beauty of the arts is a shorthand
term for "a specific aesthetic attitude to reality .. .
untranslatable into logical language ... a specific
means of artistic perception and cognition," one
that "restores the ambivalent wholeness" of life
(The Dialogic Imagination 201). What Bakhtin notices
here, long before Jacques Derrida, is that a reliance
on language alone gives a deceptively rational and
linear view of things-and that's the whole trouble.
Rather what we need is a better way to restore this
ambivalent wholeness of life.
One way to restore wholeness is to see beauty
as what Bakhtin calls a "transgredient"-an incarnate aspect of the relational interplay of being and
knowing that reaches across the seemingly impossible separation between concrete things (such as
marble sculptures and American graduate students) and enters into the very heart of our ability
to know anything at all, least of all ourselves. As he
writes in the 1919 fragmented text we know as Art
and Answerability:
The more the moment of trust and the tones
of faith and hope gain immediate actuality,
the more certain aesthetic moments begin
to penetrate into self-accounting. When
the organizing role [in our narrating inner
voice] passes from repentance to trust, an
aesthetic form, a concord, becomes possible .. in anticipation of beauty in God,
tranquility, concord, and measure become
possible ... values that are shared in common by life and by art .. are an aesthetic of
lived life. (3, his emphasis)
00

00

This is "bio-graphical" architectonics -literally
"life" in "writing"- as he calls it. As such, it is a
relational philosophical system founded on the
ever-shifting and never-finalized time/space interplay between the inner and outer discourses of
each individual person in conversation with the
narrating "others" both within and without our
lives-including, of course, works of art. It is in
precisely this way that beauty functions as that
space/time "transgredient" that encodes its role as
the boundary-bridging element of epistemological truth-telling outside of words.

A

PARTICULAR EXAMPLE OF THIS IDEA AT WORK

can be found in a short scene from the
Academy-Award-winning 1999 film
American Beauty, directed by Sam Mendes and
written by Alan Ball. In this scene, the troubled
teenaged boy next door shares his video image of
"the most beautiful thing in the world"-a floating plastic bag on a windy day. "Beauty," as the
character tells us, is to him an emblem of all that
lies unseen and unsaid and, in this case, taken for
granted: "[I]t was then that I knew there was this
incredibly benevolent force that told me not to be
afraid." In fact, this amazing scene of the slowly
floating and dancing bag makes his "heart feel like
bursting from so much beauty." It also shows its
audience the transcendent truth that the simplest
beautiful thing is also capable of teaching a troubled soul that "an incredibly benevolent force"
both existed and did not want him to be afraid.
I was first alerted to the hidden power of
this scene-and its transcendent and even spiritual imagery-in a keynote address by Robert K.
Johnston of Fuller Seminary at a recent conference
held at Azusa Pacific University. Johnston has written several books about the power of contemporary
art forms (such as film) for people of faith who may
have only a limited understanding of the way unsettling truths can be, should be, and are used by God.
This film's overall argument is that beauty is what
helps jolt us alive and what helps transform our
sadness and brokenness into "so much gratitude
for every single day of my stupid little life," as the
main character Lester Burnham (Kevin Spacey) says
at the very end of the film. As such, then, we know
we are in the presence of a kind of beautiful truth-

telling that "embraces the ambivalent wholeness of
life" when encountering a film such as this one.
As in Bakhtin's formulation, the beauty here is
also truth-telling because of the "responding and
answering soul" there present in the same space/
time moment-both the troubled teenaged boy and
the young girl who comes to love and understand
him through the eloquent silence of this powerful
filmic moment. Once again, these images are examples of the way that art can communicate "silence
that is not absence" as a "transgredient" that bridges
the gaps in our ability to know some of the deepest, truest things. And the "not-said" here certainly
seems to be grace and redemption-and possibly
even the presence of God. Certainly "the incredibly benevolent force that told me not to be afraid"
is both divine and mysterious for both characters
and viewers. Even, in fact, marked and incarnated
in each of the young character's lives by both handholding and a kiss-another emblem of the visible
presence of unspoken things.
The language of truth-telling in long narrative
forms such as film and the novel, then, "makes possible new things," according to Bakhtin, through its
capacity to grasp the many-sidedness and potential
of both the fleeting moment and of the most commonplace individuals and events. Such a vision is
able to capture phenomena in the process of change
and transition, what he calls "their continuous, creative, renewing, changeability." Life is both too full
and too important to "permit seriousness alone
to atrophy and break away from the unfinished
wholeness of everyday existence." Art works to
restore this ambivalent wholeness-with all its unfinalizable, changing, living breath-by operating as
discursiveness outside of words. What more truth
could we ask for?
Even the apostle Paul taught that the deepest
frameworks of knowing truth lie in human minds
that discern not with rationality but with the mysterious and beautiful truth-telling of the Holy Spirit.
The Spirit searches all things, even the deep
things of God. For who among men knows
the thoughts of a man except the man's
spirit within him? In the same way no one
knows the thoughts of God except the Spirit
of God. We have not received the spirit of

the world but the Spirit who is from God,
that we may understand what God has
freely given us. This is what we speak, not
in words taught to us by human wisdom
but in words taught by the Spirit, expressing spiritual truths in spiritual words ....
The spiritual man makes judgments about
all things, but he himself is not subject to
any man's judgment: "For who has known
the mind of the Lord that he may instruct
him?" But we have the mind of Christ. (I
Cor. 2:10-16)

M

y THIRD AND FINAL EXAMPLE OF TRUTH AND

beauty is a film entitled The New World,
written and directed by the renowned and
reclusive Terence Malick, and brought to my attention by Jeffrey Overstreet, Seattle Pacific University's
own resident film expert and Christianity Today
writer. This story is the historically accurate re-telling of the first encounters between native peoples
and Europeans in America in the early seventeenth
century and of the life of the native woman sometimes called "Pocahontas" (although that name is
never spoken in this film). More specifically, it is a
brilliant attempt to represent in the multidisciplinary
art form of film the actual process of the spirit animating a "new world" being born- both in the historical implications of that term for Americans and
Europeans and in the literally "Edenic" newness
of creation itself. The film uses to powerful effect
another masterpiece telling of the birth of a new
world- Richard Wagner's opening music to the first
opera of the epic "Ring" cycle, arguably one of the
greatest total art works (gesamptkunstwerken) ever
created. This musical leitmotif, heard in the opening of both the film and the opera, is the metaphor
and musical representation of creation itself, as you
may notice from the way the filmmaker interleaves
the notes of Wagner's overture along with natural
sounds of the forest and river in this scene-literally
allowing the sound of God's creation to "finish"
Wagner's score. It is almost like witnessing the very
act of creation itself.
The multi-valence of many different modes of
beauty in film allows Malick to enact and embody
a new world being born. Spirit is called forth,
almost literally "hovering over the waters." And a
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scene of baptismal immersion and celebration of
water, as well, recalls both Genesis and Wagner's
Rhinemaidens who open the Ring cycle in a joyous celebration of the "concord" and peace at the
waterside dawn of creation-so soon, of course, in
both cases to "fall." Here Malick actually invites
our "future remembrance," as Bakhtin says, of this
sin and brokenness, as the deadly clashes between
native peoples and European conquerors are
shown through maps and lithographs at exactly
the moment Wagner's overture begins. Malick also
foregrounds in several filmic images how both sides
are so baffled in their ability to "see" something so
completely "other" (that is, each other) that all they
have in common, quite literally, is the very life-giving waters both cultures are so utterly reliant upon.

S

O, CAN "BEAUTY SAVE THE WORLD"?

Certainly its way of knowing and truth-telling
need to enter (or re-enter) the conversation,
carrying as it does within itself both persuasiveness and its own verification. We began and now
are ending, too, with history. We are inheritors of an
immense tradition of truth and beauty in art-and
yet we must also embrace our historical chance to
re-frarne the dialogue for a new time, a new historical framework that is even now emerging in the
postrnodern period. It appears to me, so far, to be an
age seeking models of epistemology and ontology
that are relational without being relativistic, and
ethical without begin dogmatic. Its best model may
be "dialogue" and "community," if we follow what
Bakhtin has told us about the way we need each
other to complete ourselves, embracing a horizon of
vision that recognizes its human limitations while
not fearing but trusting what lies beyond. It seems
to also be a model that embraces beauty in order to
expand the avenues of access to truth-to embrace
the ambivalent wholeness of life.
And so, as the scripture in Psalm 90 says: "Let
the beauty of the Lord our God be upon us." 'f

Christine Chaney is Associate Professor and Chair of
the English Department at Seattle Pacific University.

Experiencing Beauty in the Music of the Holocaust

Benita Wolters-Fredlund

F

EW EVENTS IN WESTERN HISTORY HAVE HAD THE

kind of impact-historically, ideologically,
culturally, and psychologically-as the
Holocaust. A series of incidents of almost incomprehensible horror, the Holocaust is not only a diabolical chapter in the history of the twentieth century
but a powerful cultural symbol of humanity's evil on
the one hand and humanity's suffering on the other.
Even seventy years later, the events of the Holocaust
continue to influence our thinking on issues such as
racism, nationalism, and fascism, and we remain fascinated with and moved by stories and art related to
the holocaust in a variety of genres.
I too am drawn to the history and art of the
Holocaust, both as a Christian and as a musicologist.
As a young girl I heard stories of how my grandparents on both sides of the family lived in Nazioccupied Netherlands during the war and helped
Jews hide from the Nazis. My paternal grandparents
(Syrt and Luciena Wolters) hid a family of four in
their attic in Enschede for two and half years, beginning in 1942 (Wolters, 1995), and my maternal grandparents (Hendrikus and Wilhelmina Van Andel),
along with another Dutch family, took a young
Jewish woman and a small Jewish boy into their
home in Amhem in 1944. 1 For my grandparents, this
was an act of faith. They believed that there was no
other option for Christians but to help their victimized neighbors. I grew up understanding Holocaust
stories from the lens of Christian ethics and was terribly disillusioned to realize, as a young teenager,
that far more Christians persecuted or ignored Jews
than helped them during the war, and furthermore
that there was in the history of the church a long
tradition of anti-Semitism. Nonetheless, I am still
drawn to Holocaust topics in part because they
invite discussions about good and evil doing battle
in history. Even when these discussions are difficult,
such as when we ask how God could have allowed

the Holocaust to take place at all, they are rooted in
a clear sense of right and wrong.
As a Christian musicologist, I am drawn to
studying music of the Holocaust for some of the
same reasons. This study allows me to talk about
good and evil in the realm of musical activity in
a way that would be more difficult in relation to
other, more ubiquitous, settings. Although issues
of music and morality are notoriously difficult, few
will disagree that when SS officers forced prisoners
to play joyful tunes as other inmates walked to their
deaths, evil was taking place, whether they understand the concept of "evil" in secular or religious
terms. This acknowledgement can lead to further
insights about social and moral issues in music
making generally. But more broadly speaking,
the music of the Holocaust allows me to argue for
the all-important role of context in understanding
musical meaning, musical identity, and the experience of beauty in music. The use of music in the
original historical context of the Holocaust and our
continued fascination with music related to that
context invites fundamental questions about the
very nature of music, musical hermeneutics, and
musical aesthetics. These are questions that I invite
you to ponder with me.
Music: Object or Action?
Before exammmg specific instances of
Holocaust music, allow me briefly to address
some larger philosophical questions in musicology that have bearing on this discussion. Of the
many changes that postmodernism has brought to
the discipline of musicology in the last twenty-five
years, one of the most profound has been a shift in
our understanding of the very ontology of music.
Rather than seeing music as work-based phenomenon, a "thing," a new breed of music scholars, who
sometimes call themselves cultural musicologists,

argue that music is an experience-based phenomenon, or "action." This point was famously argued
by Christopher Small in his book Musicking, in
which he writes,
[T]he fundamental nature and meaning
of music lie not in objects, not in musical
works at all, but in action, in what people
do. It is only by understanding what people do as they take part in a musical act that
we can hope to understand its nature and
the function it fulfills in human life. (Small
1998, 8)

I will argue that this categorical or philosophical
shift-seeing music as an action rather than an
object-is enormously helpful in understanding
how music works in a particular historical and
social context, especially a context of crisis such as
the Holocaust. While I believe there is still some
place for thinking of music in terms of works, thinking of it only in these terms is limiting. Small and
others have helped clarify that if one is attempting
to make sense of the beauty, ethics, and meaning of
a musical practice, such as listening to Holocaust
music, it makes quite a difference whether you
think the heart of that practice is a thing, i.e. a musical work, or an action, i.e. a musical experience. If you
believe that the heart of musical practice lies in a
musical work, you will concern yourself primarily
with structural aspects such as melody, harmony,
rhythm, instrumentation, form, and other patterns
of sound in determining its beauty, ethics, and
meaning. If you believe that the heart of the musical practice lies in a musical experience, you have
a much broader discussion that can include the
structural aspects I've just noted, as well as a wide
variety of social, historical, and cultural realities
as interpreted by those participating in the music
making. Using this methodology, the central question of musical beauty changes from "Is the musical work beautifully constructed?" to "How is the
musical experience constructed as beautiful by
those engaged in it?"
In the following examples, I hope to show that
the experience of music as beautiful or meaningful
is dependent to a significant degree on the context
in which that music is experienced. This is espe-
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cially obvious when the context for music is an
extraordinary one, whether positive (such as falling
in love) or negative (such as war or oppression). If
this is true, the experience of music which is related
in some way to the Holocaust-whether composed and experienced during the war or in later
years-cannot help but be shaped to a significant
degree by our knowledge of this cataclysmic event
in world history. While much Holocaust music has
structural aspects that can be understood as beautiful-tuneful melodies, rich harmonies, or poignant
settings of texts, for example-these structural
aspects alone cannot fully explain why such music
has the power to move us so deeply.
Music and Context-" Ani Ma'amin"
To put some of this theorizing into practice,
allow me to tell you about "Ani Ma'amin" or "I
believe," a Hebrew song sung by religious Jews
who were executed in the concentration camps.
The text for this song comes from a creed based on
the writings of Rabbi Moses ben Maimon, a twelfthcentury theologian and philosopher also known as
Maimonides. In his commentary on the Messiah,
Maimonides compiled thirteen articles of faith
which were later written as a creed by an anonymous author. These articles include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

The existence of God
The absolute unity of God
The incorporeality of God
The eternity of God
That God alone is to be worshipped
That God communicates to prophets
That Moses is the greatest prophet
That the Torah was given by God
That the Torah is immutable
That there is divine providence
That there is divine punishment
and reward
That there will be a Messiah
That the dead will be resurrected
(See skin)

It is common among observant Jews to recite this

poetic version of the thirteen articles as a daily
prayer, beginning each article with the phrase "Ani

ma'amin be-emunah shelemah" ("I believe with perfect faith"). These powerful statements of belief
were in tum used as texts for songs, especially the
penultimate article, "I believe with perfect faith in
the coming of the Messiah."
AniMa'amin
Traditional, arr. Robert Applebaum

Ani ma'amin,
Be'emunah sh'leima
B'viat hamashiach
V'afal pi she'yitmamei'ah
Im kol zeh achakeh lo b'chol yam sheyavo
Anima'amin
I believe,
With complete belief,
In the coming of the Messiah.
And even though he may tarry,
I will await him each and every day.
I believe. (Applebaum 2003)
One version of this faithful text set to music
became popular in the Warsaw ghetto, where it was
also known as the "Varshever geto-lid fun frumer yid'"
("song of religious Jews in the Warsaw ghetto")
(Gilbert 2005, 48). It soon spread to other Polish
ghettos such as in Lublin, Lodz, and Bialystock,
and subsequently to death camps where ghetto
inhabitants were sent to be killed (Rubin 2000, 425
and 457). Singing this familiar text about hope in
the Messiah in the face of persecution, starvation,
and the knowledge of certain death transformed a
ubiquitous daily liturgical ritual into a profound
statement of faith.
According to the accounts of survivors, believing Jews sometimes sang this song while walking to
their deaths in the gas chambers (Gottfarstein 1981,
299). In the Jewish tradition, willingly going to one's
death "for the Holy Name" (kiddush ha-shem) rather
than forsaking Judaism is considered the highest
form of religious devotion (Eisenberg 1981, 280).
In addition to other sacrificial humanitarian acts
on behalf of others, using one's death to witness to
God's existence and righteousness was understood
as a way to sanctify the Name of God and an important aspect of so-called "spiritual resistance" during

the war (Melnick 1995, 396). Thus proudly singing
"Ani Ma'amin" on the way to death changed what
might have been yet another meaningless death
of a faceless Jew into an act of courageous martyrdom. Jewish music scholar Ruth Rubin, commenting about such religious songs sung on the way to
death, describes the powerful ability of music to
frame an event: "[W]ith a tune, religious Jews martyred themselves" (Rubin, 425). Indeed, in this context music acted as a powerful tool for constructing
social meaning in this specific context.
After the war, the song "Ani Ma'amin" came
to hold special symbolic meaning in relation to the
Holocaust and was used in some of the very first
Holocaust memorial ceremonies and programs
(Ofer 2000, 36). It continues to be a favorite musical
choice for Holocaust commemorations today, often
in new arrangements by contemporary composers (Gilbert 2005, 196) such as Robert Applebaum's
arrangement for four-parts. The tune has a folk-like
poignancy and the harmonies used in Applebaum's
setting are austere and powerful, but our experience of the beauty and meaning of this piece are
inextricably bound to our knowledge of its original
context. We respond to the beauty of the melody
and harmony, yes, but even more we respond to
the poignant act of faith and courage that this song
represents. Furthermore, our knowledge about the
context of deep suffering and loss of the Holocaust
makes this piece far more moving than its structural aspects alone would be, and this experience of
being moved is mapped onto our experience of its
beauty as well.
Musical Meaning in Context- Handel's
Judas Maccabaeus
So far, I have argued that in experiencing
music's beauty and meaning, context is key. This is
demonstrated in my next example as well, the performance of Handel's oratorio Judas Maccabaeus by
left-wing Jews in North America during the 1940s
who interpreted it as a Holocaust piece (WoltersFredlund 2005, 197-212). You might think that a
work written by Handel in England in 1746 is an
unlikely candidate for Holocaust music, and in a
way, that is precisely the point I am making. One
musical work can be interpreted and experienced
in radically different ways in different contexts.

In order to understand the different contexts in
which Judas Maccabaeus was interpreted, a brief
explanation of the work's content and history is
warranted. The oratorio outlines the rebellion and
eventual victory of the Jewish people, led by the
Maccabee family, against their Syrian oppressors
in the second century BC. The text for the oratorio, written for Handel by Rev. Thomas Morell and
based on the account of the Maccabean family as
found in the Apocrypha, describes the Jewish people mourning the loss of Jerusalem and the temple,
the loss of their religious freedom, and the death of
the leader of their rebellion, Mattathias. It then outlines a series of military battles led by Mattathias's
son, Judas, who, despite having a smaller and less
sophisticated army, leads the Jews to a series of
victories. The most important of these victories is
the recovery of the temple, which subsequent generations have celebrated during Chanukah, the festival of rededication or festival of lights.
As it happens, Handel's musical setting of the
story of the Maccabees has a long history of being
interpreted in relation to contemporary politics.
When Handel wrote the oratorio in 1746, he did
so to celebrate the British victory over the Jacobite
rebellion of 1745, led by Bonnie Prince Charlie. The
principal concerns in the story of the Maccabaen
revolt-religious identity, freedom of worship, liberty, national unity, and national independencehad strong parallels to British fears of French
imperialism generally and the alliance between the
Jacobites and the French specifically (Smith 1998,
61). Handel's oratorio, dedicated to the Duke of
Cumberland, the leader of the British at the decisive Battle of Culloden, was a huge success.
Judas Maccabaeus was quick to become one
of Handel's most enduringly popular oratorios.
In the decades after it was written, the work was
brought over to Germany, where it also became
"a treasured national possession" (Dean 1959, 465)
and the most popular of all Handel's oratorios
except Messiah (Levi 1994, 79). In fact, it was used
there too in celebration of war victory and national
pride. In the late 1920s, the hero in the oratorio was
understood as "an exemplar of Teutonic military
superiority" (Smith 1995, 212). The association
between Judas Maccabaeus and German nationalism became a problem for the Nazi party in the
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1930s, however, since the work's Jewish hero did
not fit with the party's anti-Semitic worldview.
As part of the party's initiative to "Aryanize" all
music in Germany, Judas Maccabaeus was revised
and rewritten numerous times in German. One
version, which portrayed the main character as a
"powerful military dictator-in other words, the
Fiihrer himself," was quite popular and received
several performances throughout Germany (Levi
1994, 80).
Amazingly, only a few years later, several
composers and conductors working in the cultural circles of the Jewish left in North America
came up with the idea to sing this same oratorio
in Yiddish as an act of solidarity with their brothers and sisters persecuted in Europe. For these
Yiddish choruses, the story told in the oratorio
had numerous meaningful parallels to modern
circumstances: sorrow and anger at the oppression of Jews, the determination to fight against
this oppression, and especially hope in the ability of a small Jewish minority to triumph over a
sophisticated and brutal persecutor.
One could argue that the story of the Maccabees
is amazingly well-suited to speak to the struggle
of the Jews against the Nazis. In fact, the parallel
between the Jews oppressed under Syrian rule and
the Jews oppressed under Nazi rule is a remarkably straightforward and self-evident one, much
more so than Handel and Morell's original parallel
of the story to the victory over the Scottish uprising
or the manipulation of the story by Nazi Germany
to parallel their perceived military and Aryan
supremacy.
A few other aspects of the interpretation of
this work by left-wing Jews are worth mentioning. One point I have already alluded to, which is
that in a somewhat strange and ironic twist, these
choirs used this Jewish story to express a Jewish
identity, rather than an English or German one,
an association made more potent by singing the
work in Yiddish translation. In addition, for these
choirs, which were associated with the communist-sympathizing arm of the Jewish labor movement, the story of the Macabees was interpreted as
politically progressive. As one long-time member
of the Jewish left, Millie Gold, described it: "we
could interpret the Maccabees as revolutionaries"

(Jacobson 2004, 183). In their socialist reading of
the story of the Maccabees, the figure of Judas was
seen as a Jewish folk hero, a grass-roots leader who
overthrew tyrannical forces to bring equality and
justice to the people through revolution.
All this background information about the history of interpretation of Judas Maccabaeus makes
the point that experiences of the same musical work can vary wildly in different contexts.
While the melodies and harmonies and basic plot
were similar in each circumstance in which Judas
Maccabaeus was performed, its meaning and effect
changed considerably. It changed from an English
story celebrating victory over perceived political
and religious persecution, to a German story celebrating military strength and Aryan supremacy,
to a Jewish story celebrating socialism and the triumph of a small minority. The character of Judas,
meanwhile, was understood to be either the Duke
of Cumberland, Adolf Hitler, or a Jewish folk hero.
For all groups who sang the work, it held very rich
and multi-layered meaning, but their messages
were startlingly dissimilar.
Moreover, I assume from the huge popularity of the work in each of these contexts that
the work was considered beautiful. The famous
post-war Handel scholar Winton Dean pans Judas
Maccabaeus in his 1959 opus on Handel's oratorios, claiming that the work has been "consistently
overvalued," and calling it "not so much a work
of art as a victory concert," with a libretto that is
"crude" and "blatant" (Dean 1959, 465-6). But for
centuries this oratorio has been loved by communities who found it meaningful. Today, one
who listens, for example, to the slow and mournful soprano aria "Ah! Wretched Israel" and who
considers the rich layers of meaning held in this
work by North American Jews who performed it
during the war, will find it difficult to describe the
music as "crude.
Handel's Judas Maccabaeus (1746),
"Ah! Wretched Israel"
Text: Rev. Thomas Morell

Ah! wretched, wretched Israel! fall'n how low,
From joyous transport to desponding woe.
(Handel1939)

Yiddish Adaptation by Max Helfman
(music and text, 1942)

From the deep, deep valley of lamentation,
brothers, hear!
It's the crying of the children of our people,
Of a people in sorrow, of a people in pain.
Hear the lamenting cry!
(Krasny 1942)
Yiddish Adaptation by Emil Gartner (music)
and Vladimir Krasny (text, 1942)

You fall, Oh poor Israel, deep down
From the peak of celebration into the pit of lamenting.
(Helfman 1942)
Musical Identity-Helfman's Di Naye Hagode
Another Holocaust piece allows us to explore
how music can be used to express and construct
identity and how beauty plays a role in that
dynamic. Composed in 1948, Di Naye Hagode (or
New Haggadah) is a cantata by Jewish-American
composer Max Helfman for narrator, chorus,
orchestra, and dancers. It is an adaptation in
English and Yiddish of the epic Yiddish poem by
Jewish-Soviet poet ltzik Fefer called "Shadows of
the Warsaw Ghetto" about the events of the Warsaw
ghetto uprising. This work quickly became popular
in circles of the Jewish left in post-war years and
remains a popular work today (Wolters-Fredlund
2005, 154--161).
Since the reception of this work among North
American Jews after the war is tied closely to the
iconic status of the story of the uprising itself, a brief
summary of these events seems warranted. After the
Nazis had deported over 250,000 of the inhabitants
of Poland's Warsaw ghetto in 1942, a small army
of partisan fighters successfully resisted further
deportations in January 1943 with smuggled and
hand-made weapons. This small success prompted
them to make plans for an uprising, so that when
the German troops returned on 19 April, on the eve
of Passover, to deport the remaining 50,000 inhabitants of the ghetto, most residents were concealed
in hideouts and subterranean bunkers and about
750 were organized in a resistance unit. In the largest single instance of Jewish rebellion during the

war, the ghetto fighters defended the ghetto for a
month's time before they finally were crushed on
16May.
Although most involved in the uprising eventually died or were sent to camps, the story of the
uprising had, and continues to have, tremendous
symbolic importance as a story of human dignity
and honor in resistance to oppression. Ghetto fighters were untrained and had few resources against
the sophistication of Hitler's army, and yet they
refused to be taken away without a fight, insisting,
in the rousing words of underground organizers
to "die as human beings" (Center for Advanced
Holocaust Studies 2004). Amazingly, they were
able to keep back German troops longer than some
European countries. As historian Israel Gutman
asserts,
No act of Jewish resistance during the
Holocaust fired the imagination quite as
much as the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of
April1943. It was an event of epic proportions, pitting a few poorly armed, starving
Jews against the might of Nazi power....
The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is a historical event, but it also has become a symbol
of Jewish resistance and determination, a
moment in history that has transformed
the self-perception of the Jewish people
from passivity to active armed struggle ....
[It] has become a universal symbol for
resistance and courage. (Gutman 1994, xixii)
As Gutman describes it, the story of the ghetto
uprising was and is inexorably tied to constructions
of Jewish identity in the post-Holocaust era. For
many Jews, the story of the uprising acts as proof
that Jews are not a weak, helpless, and defenseless
people, but a proud people willing to fight for their
freedom or die trying. For left-wing Jews, of course,
this story, like Judas Maccabaeus, could also be
interpreted as a story of revolution in which the
poor starving masses took up arms against their
brutal oppressors.
In both Fefer's original poem about the uprising and in Helfman's adaptation, the militaristic
resistance of the ghetto fighters is emphasized in
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dramatic fighting scenes which describe the shooting, blood, and flames of the battle in vivid and
sometimes graphic language. The attackers are
said to have had "venom in their eyes, with satanic
faces;" the ghetto martyrs "boldly threw themselves on tanks"; the gunfire is described using the
phrase "it rained lead in the Warsaw ghetto"; and
the casualties are implied in the phrase ''bloody rivers streamed on" (Helfman 2006). In one passage,
fierce language is used to express the view that if
even one German dies at the hands of the ghetto
fighters, the uprising would hold meaning: "If into
these Jewish fingernails shall fall even just one
butcher to be strangled and choked, one who will
not live to see the crack of dawn, I will, from the
grave, bless these sons of mine" (Helfman 2006). In
the middle of the cantata the battle is evoked using
colorful language:
Max Helfman's Di Naye Hagode (1948)
Narrator (English):
What three-footed messenger flies through the
ghetto?
The terrible news has routed the Seder like the
crack of a shot.
All eyes are aflame, all hearts filled with courage.
They've come! They've come!
The poison-filled hordes, the slayers have come!
They were met, met like rare guests, but with lightening and thunder
by the white-robed fathers, 2 by the queen of each
house.
Each room is a bastion, each cellar a fortress.
They shoot in the ghetto!
Di Shlakht (The Battle)- Chorus (Yiddish):
There's shooting in the ghetto, and the ghetto
replies,
Hate with hate, fire with fire.
Guns converse here.
The ghetto seethes with new infernos.
(Helfman 1950)
Juxtaposed with this militaristic language and
music are passages which describe the everyday
lives of ghetto inhabitants and their observance of
the Passover ritual in particular. In his poem about

the uprising, ltzik Fefer makes frequent reference
to the Jewish Haggadah, a word translated generically as "narrative" or "saga," but conventionally
used to refer to the ritual retelling of the Exodus
story during the Passover Seder dinner, the account
of the ancient Israelites being liberated from slavery in Egypt and their journey to a new homeland.
Fefer makes a connection between the Jewish resistance in Warsaw and the Exodus, suggesting that
the ghetto uprising is a "new exodus," and referring
in his poem to "di naye hagode," a "new haggadah"
that will commemorate the Warsaw Ghetto fighters. Because the uprising began on the eve of the
Passover this correlation has a special poignancy.
The cantata opens with one of the four questions traditionally asked by the youngest member
at a Seder celebration, "Ma nishtano halaylo haze
mikol haleyloys?" "How is this night different from
all other nights?" But in this instance the "night"
in question is not the night of the ancient Israelites'
flight from Egypt but the night of the German attack
in Warsaw in 1943.

Ma Nishtano-Chorus (Yiddish)
How is this night different from all other nights?
Why?
Why is this night different from all other nights of
our lives?
Why?

They roam through streets and alleys
They knock in darkness on wide-open doors,
They mourn near ruins, they sleep on hard floors,
They fall upon dark, cold dirt roads.
They rise once again and wander exhausted
Through gray abysses, over verdant peaks.
They have not yet recited their confession;
They cannot yet find their rest.
Early in the morning, late at night
They roam, the shadows of the Warsaw Ghetto.
(Helfman, 2006)
This central question is repeated throughout the
work and finally answered by the Narrator in
English, who says,
Why is this night different from all other
nights? Because on this Seder night we

remember them all, those nameless shadows who have died so that we may live;
who have borne their suffering so that we
may live in freedom. In us and in our children, their blessed memories shall live on
and on. (Helfman 2006)
This emphasis on religious themes is one of
the more interesting aspects of Helfman's cantata
and its reception. On the face of it, it would seem
quite incongruous that a work with blatant religious themes would become so popular among
Yiddish folk choirs in North America, since they
had historically been resolutely secular. Before the
war, Yiddish choruses of the Jewish left pointedly
had avoided sacred music of any kind. It is worth
noting, for example, that Helfman was one of the
many who wrote adaptations of Judas Maccabeus in
the early 1940s, and his Yiddish text omits all references to God and all religious language found in
Morell's original libretto. For example, one Judas
Maccabaeus chorus, which in the original spoke
of not bowing down to idols ("We never shall
bow down to the rude stock or cultured stone")
became a chorus about not bowing to the enemy
in Helfman's 1942 Yiddish version: "We will never
bow before the rod, The enemy's rod, the barbarian
whip smeared with our blood" (Helfman 1942).
But by the time he wrote Di Naye Hagode in
1948, Helfman was following in the footsteps of
others in the circles of the Jewish Left who began
to have a more relaxed attitude to religious themes
during and after the war. Even years earlier, during
the war, other Yiddish versions of Judas Maccabaeus,
for example, kept the religious language of Morell's
libretto intact, such as the adaptation by Vladimir
Krasny. In Krasny's Yiddish adaptation, even such
devout texts as "0 Father, Whose Almighty Power,"
"Father of Heav'n, from Thy eternal throne" "Hear
us, 0 Lord, on Thee we call," and (most amazingly!)
"We worship God, and God alone" were sung in
almost exact translation in Yiddish-a practice that
would have been unthinkable before the war. 3
This relaxed attitude to religious themes can be
explained in part by the trend among those in the
circles of the Jewish Left to identify themselves with
a broad Jewish diaspora during the war rather than
primarily the Jewish working classes and commu-

rust-sympathizing Jews. During the war, concert
program texts of the Toronto Jewish Folk Choir,
for example, speak of "our brothers and sisters in
Europe who are standing on the front lines of the
struggle against our enemy" (Harris 1943). In the
program for this choir's May 1943 concert, which
contained several essays about the war, one choir
leader asserts that "unity needs to be strengthened
among all Jews," and choir director Emil Gartner
argues that unity is a vital component to ending the
war, and adds, "that unity we owe to the millions of
our brothers and sisters chained and murdered by
the Nazi beast" (Gartner 1943).
Helfman's cantata Di Naye Hagode is certainly
not a religious work in the conventional sense. In
fact, no mention is made in the cantata of a God
who controls the destiny of the Jews. The work is
focused entirely on the heroism of the ghetto fighters. But throughout the cantata, images from the
Seder ritual permeate the work in such a way as to
add poignancy and depth and are always treated
respectfully. It affectionately describes households celebrating the Seder in the ghetto who have
opened their doors "in expectation of the prophet
Elijah," and after the Seder has been interrupted by
the German attack, it describes how "the Seder is
deserted. The wind now alone chants the prayers."
At several points in the cantata, the text is spoken
as a prayer, for example, "0 Father in Heaven can
it really be that in this city of desolation our people
once lived and worked and bargained and played
with their children?" Moreover, Helfman made use
of traditional Judaic chant formulas in several sections of the work, especially in places where the text
of the original Haggadah is recalled. By including
religious language and allusions to the Passover ritual and at the same time emphasizing the militaristic and revolutionary aspects of the story, Helfman
paints a picture of the Jewish people that is united
across religious and political lines. Music is thus
used as a tool to shape Jewish identity in quite specific ways in relation to the Holocaust.
For the Jews in North America who sang and
continue to sing Di Naye Hagode, its connection to
a Jewish identity goes beyond a corporate Jewish
identity to include a personal Jewish identity as
well. Especially when it was sung just after the war,
Di Naye Hagode had an intense emotional impact on
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those who sang and heard it because so many had
lost and friends and family in Poland or in other
ghettos and prison camps. One Toronto chorister,
named Brenda Fishauf, who had come to Canada
from Poland in 1937 and lost most of her extended
family in Poland during the war, highlighted Di
Naye Hagode as one of the most meaningful works
she sang in her decades with the Toronto Jewish
Folk Choir. She felt as if in singing Di Naye Hagode
she was telling her own personal story. When I
asked her about singing this work after the war, she
described her experience by interweaving themes
of meaning, identity, suffering, and beauty. In her
description, these elements (meaning, identity, suffering, and beauty) seem to be different ways for her
to describe the same experience. As she explains,
The music was so beautiful. Not just the
music but the contents of it, you know,
what it was all about. And of course, having left family in Poland, you know, I mean
it was sort of like tied up with my past,
my suffering and so on.... It was so moving. I mean, I had to fight with myself not
to cry while I was singing it, because I felt
just because I carne from [Poland] ... I was
telling my story, sort of, you know? That's
what it meant to me. (Fishauf, interview by
author, 31 October 2003)
Fishauf's words demonstrate how the context of
this work and its role in "telling her story" were
both inextricably bound to her experience of the
work generally and the work's beauty in particular.
Her comments indicate that Holocaust music not
only shaped and expressed corporate Jewish identities but personal ones as well. Her description
also strongly suggests that the experience of beauty
is not just heavily shaped by the meaning and context of a work but can often be related to specific
personal experiences.
Musical Memorialization-A Child's Journey
(Horvit/Barzlai)
The theme of telling a personal story runs
through our final example of Holocaust music as
well, a piece called A Child's Journey. The poems
for this work were written many years after the

Holocaust by Yaakov Barzilai, a Hungarian-born
Jew who survived the Bergen-Belzen concentration
camp as a child and immigrated to Israel in 1949.
In these poems, Barzilai looks back on his childhood and reflects on the traumatic loss of innocence
experienced in his own life and in the lives of other
Holocaust children. That Barzilai is an adult looking
back and interpreting his experiences is made clear
by the reflective opening phrase, "fifty years ago ... "
but his use of sparse and simple language throughout evoke a child's voice and perspective as well.
Throughout the poem these two perspectives-the
knowing adult and the innocent child-are understood simultaneously. While the child in the poem
is not fully aware of his or her circumstances, the
author and audience understand it all too well.
Michael Horvit's A Child's Journey (1998)
Text (Hebrew): Yaakov Barzilai (b. 1933);
Translation: Shulamit Riedman
1. An Accidental Meeting
Fifty years ago
when all the trains
traveled toward one destination
my mother introduced me
to God
He joined us-on our journey.
2. I Once Had a Friend
I once had a friend
a symbol of cleanliness
who even defeated the lice.
One day,
he was taken to the shower
and never again
did I see him
clean.
3. There are No Stars in the Sky
"Why are there no stars in the sky?"
The children of God inquired,
"And why even lamps do not shine there
either?"
The children repeatedly wondered.
"And if there are no stars
or lamps
then, how can God see

when we wash in the shower?"
"He does not see in the dark"
the angels responded.
And it was the truth,
when the faucets were open
that God did not see
they did not have water
And never again
did the children ask
"Why?" (Horvit, 1998)
The composer Michael Horvit intentionally
kept his musical setting of these poems sparse and
restrained as well, to match the nai:ve tone of the
poems and to reflect, in his words "the wonderment of innocent children who could not fully comprehend the horrors they faced in the Holocaust"
(McCullough 1999). This child-like simplicity of the
text and the music, and also the childhood innocence it represents, are some of the most moving
and beautiful aspects of this set of pieces.
Another important aspect of Holocaust music
and our experience of it is our understanding that
performing and listening to Holocaust pieces today
is an act of commemoration and memorialization.
Experiencing Holocaust music today is an act of
remembrance. By listening we are saying "we
remember the millions who suffered and died, and
we remember the millions more who survived but
were never the same." This type of cultural work
is sometimes explicit-as in the cantata Di Naye
Hagode, whose text charges the Jewish community
to remember the Warsaw Ghetto fighters every year
in the same way that they remember the Exodus
every year, in a new haggadic ritual. And it is sometimes tacit, as in the poems and music of A Child's
Journey, which provide an unspoken invitation to us
to remember and contemplate the special suffering
of children of the Holocaust. This act of respectful
remembrance is part of our experience of the music,
and, I would argue, helps to make our experience of
the music meaningful and beautiful. We react not
only to the stories and the sounds we hear in the
music but the very act of commemoration.
The act of memorialization through musical
activity also goes a long way to explaining how it
is that Holocaust music can have a redemptive and
healing effect despite the deep suffering to which it

alludes. The themes of music of the Holocaust are
some of the darkest imaginable, including unspeakable violence, the tragic death of millions, the
depravity of humankind, and the silence of God. At
its worst, dwelling on such themes has the potential
to become a kind of glorification of horror, violence,
and sin and may even, as some have worried, blind
us to the evils of our own time (Kimmelman 2009).
But at its best, our acknowledgement and articulation of these dark themes allows us to pay tribute
to those who suffered, and ensures that we will not
add to the tragedy of the Holocaust by forgetting
its victims.

I

N ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE WAYS IN WHICH

music affects us and shapes our world, we need
to understand music as far more than an object
but also as a social and cultural experience rooted
in a specific place, time, group of people, and circumstances. As I hope my various examples have
shown, performing and listening to Holocaust
music cannot be fully understood if it is analyzed
entirely in terms of an act of detached aesthetic
contemplation. Listening to Holocaust music is far
more that this. Other actions hovering around the
musical space are the construction of identity, the
interpretation of musical meaning, and the performance of memorialization, to name only those
discussed here. Each of these acts affects our expe-
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study and understand this experience. The study
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1. In 1993 my paternal grandparents were honored

for their bravery by the Israeli government with the
Medal of the Righteous Among the Nations. The honor
was granted posthumously to my grandmother, who
passed away in 1959. My maternal grandparents and
the other family soon fled Arnhem on foot together and

McCullough, Donald. Holocaust Cantata- Songs
from the Camps. Audio CD. Liner notes by
James Carman. Albany, 1999.

lived together in nearby Velp, since Arnhem was declared a war zone after the battle there in 1944.
2. A white robe (kitl) is worn by the head of house-

Melnick, Ralph. "Our Own Deeper Joy: Spiritual
Resistance after the Holocaust," The Journal of
Religion 75/3 (July 1995): 392-400.0fer, Dalia.
"The Strength of Remembrance: Commemorating the Holocaust during the First Decade of

hold presiding over the Seder in many Jewish customs.
3. My thanks to Gloria Brumer, whose comparison
of the Yiddish text used by the choir against the original
English text I am drawing from here.

pulpit and pew
Sun, Rain, and Mercy
Paul Koch

I

USED TO SAY WHENEVER IT RAINED , " AT LEAST

it's good for the farmers." No matter if rainstorms were ruining my outdoor plans, there
were farmers somewhere who were benefiting.
That is what I thought. These days I am a pastor whose congregations are comprised of farmers ,
and I no longer know what to think. I do not pray
for sunshine, and I do not pray for rain. I pray for
"sunshine and rain in the right proportion." I pray
for "weather that will make our crops grow." One
farmer in my parish will refer to it only as "the
r-word," lest the good Lord hear the word rain
and open the faucets too far. A few summers ago,
we had enough showers that people were kicking
themselves for not planting rice. The next summer
we had dry, cracked fields. Then, it rained. There
were sighs of relief, but in some quarters relief
gave way immediately to apprehension: let's just
hope we don't get too much.
For all the things humankind has learned to
tame, weather remains uncontrollable. We have
messed up global climate systems through negligence, but we have not figured out how to get the
weather we want when we want it. Since farming
depends on weather, it is one of the few jobs whose
success remains truly uncertain year after year.
Will our granaries be full or empty? God knows.
And he is the only one. There is no use pretending we can really control the outcome by our own
machinations. By our machines, we might increase
yields proportionately to labor, but in the end, God
determines abundance or famine.
If modernity has diminished our religious
humility, the subject of weather has been one
of the last strongholds for God's sovereignty.
Natural selection may determine the idiosyncrasies of species; class struggle might be the cause
of political upheaval; and social constructs might
be to blame for gender roles; but weather has been
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one phenomenon where people still feel God's
absolute rule. Prayers increase during crisis, and
my farmers are aware of the perpetual crisis that
their livelihood hangs on God's decision to send
rain and sunshine in good measure.
That is why it has surprised me recently to
see pastors and congregations excusing God from
responsibility for natural disasters. A recent publication from church headquarters commended a
church sign in Mississippi that read: "Hurricane
Katrina was an act of nature. What goes on
here is an act of God." A strange contradiction.
Hurricanes, tornadoes, and wildfires have made
a lot of headlines the last few years. What a funny
notion that in each case God arrived just a little
too late. He made it in time for the rescue workers. He arrived when churches opened their doors
to care for the victims. If only he had been there
when the trouble started!
Deism is rearing its head, although today's is
a new mixed breed. This is a gentler deism. Gone
is the cold theology suggesting that God created
the world like a clock, wound it up, and then just
stood back to watch. The newly arrived warm theology teaches that God wound it up, stands back
during disasters, presumably cursing himself for
those errors in his design, and then steps in to do
clean-up.
This is a kinder deism, since God gets credit for
the good stuff, and nature gets blamed for the bad.
Some theologians try to squeeze a little divine sovereignty into this mix by saying that God liinits himself during disasters. God could intervene to stop
hurricanes, but he chooses not to, so as to preserve
either the system he fashioned, with all its rules of
action and consequence, or human freedom, which
to be truly free, supposedly, must be allowed to
stumble-although why God values these rules or
human freedom so much is left a mystery.

And if a little divine sovereignty is squeezed
pronounces a rare verdict on Job's assessment: he
did not sin with his lips.
in, why not a little divine sympathy as well? Fear
not. God does not just limit himself. When tragedy
hits, his is the first heart to break. I do not know
N THE RECENT TWO-HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY
if William Sloane Coffin was the first to say it, but
of Charles Darwin's birthday, a National
preachers have been repeating it ever since. So,
Public Radio host commented that
there you have it: God's sovereignty and compasDarwin's theories had liberated God from responsion are both left intact.
sibility for suffering. It's not God, after all, who kills
What is not left intact, however, is a biblical
things; it's just the system he created, a system which
portrait of God. "He it is," Psalm 135 says, "who
results in salutary adaptations through survival of
makes the clouds rise at the end of the earth; he
the fittest. Here we see the devil's mischief. When
makes lightning for the rain
we think that God is in
and brings out the wind
need of liberation and that
from his storehouses." This
we are his liberators, theolIt
has
always
been
an
intricate
is not a clockmaker who
ogy has gotten itself backsits back and watches his
wards. We do not liberate
calculus, trying to figure
handiwork tick. This is a
God; nor is it our place to
out who is responsible for
king who enters his own
question or judge him. He
treasury-the King James
liberates, questions, and
suffering-whether God, his
captures
it
well- and
judges us. His opinion is
creation, or the devil-but
pulls out the treasures of
ultimately what counts.
Scripture
does
not
view
these
the wind. Of course that
This is a hard posimakes God responsible for
tion
to maintain when
options as mutually exclusive,
destruction and human sufAmerican Christians view
and through it all God's
fering, but Scripture thinks
their churches with the
same consumeristic menGod is justified in inflicting
sovereignty is maintained.
it. The prophetic corpus is
tality they wield on their
glorious for its promises
grocery stores. Give me a
that God will restore his
palatable portrayal of God,
people, but they need to be restored precisely
one pleasant to my way of thinking, or I'll shop
because God has scattered and destroyed them.
elsewhere. Suggesting that God's opinion is what
counts, and that his wrath means death for us, does
For idolatries and oppressions galore, God sends
invading armies, both of the military and locust
not attract customers. After September 11, 2001,
variety.
preachers rushed to defend God: he was surely not
It has always been an intricate calculus, tryresponsible for all that suffering. But when considering the Galilean victims of Pilate's cruelty and the
ing to figure out who is responsible for sufferTower of Siloam that killed eighteen people, Jesus
ing-whether God, his creation, or the devil-but
scripture does not view these options as mutually
did not liberate God from responsibility. In fact, he
exclusive, and through it all God's sovereignty is
made God more unattractive still. A nervous, modmaintained. Who inflicts all that calamity on Job?
em preacher would have denied both that God was
Satan does but only when God allows it. God
responsible for the tragedies and that they were
places Job in Satan's hands, and when Job's livepunishments from God against sin. But in Luke 13,
stock are stolen, his servants and children are all
Jesus rules out neither possibility. He says, rather,
dead, and his own body is covered in sores, Job
that the victims of these tragedies were no worse
knows that regardless of Satan's involvement, it is
sinners than anyone else. Repent, he told his listenGod who has given and God who has taken away.
ers, or you will all perish as they did.
It is a harsh judgment against us and certainly
Job asks, "Shall we receive good from God, and
shall we not receive evil?" Remarkably, scripture
a harsh way for God to reveal himself, but through

O

it all God is already bearing in on us with his grace.
What is there for a sinner to do when God really is
sovereign and when he really does find me wanting in righteousness? What is there to do if God's
wrath against my sins really means the death of
me? What is there to do but cry for mercy?

I

T IS NO ACCIDENT THAT ONE OF THE CHURCH' S

penitential moments arrives according
to the agricultural calendar. Rogation Days
are always the days leading up to Ascension, not
because of any connection to Easter but because
the Easter season is the time of tilling and planting in the Northern Hemisphere. Rogation is a
time of asking for God's mercy, and it is largely an
agricultural custom. Where God's sovereignty is
felt-as it is by farmers so dependent on weather
systems beyond their control-there people must
pray for mercy. During processional litanies, the
faithful send up their cries of kyrie eleison. Lord,
have mercy. You, 0 God, rule over the sun and
rain, so mercifully bless us with a good growing
season. Bless us with abundant crops that we may
feed our families and care for others in need.
I have to wonder whether Rogation processions will catch on again- and not only in farming
towns-as our economy collapses, our ecosystems
falter, and our country labors on in multiple wars.
A person could analyze any of these disasters and
seek their causes simply in terms of human error:
our greed, our lack of government regulation, our
militarism, our disregard for future generations.
But a Christian cannot look at such things and see
only human agency. A Christian must look at these
things and see also the hand of God, punishing us,
demanding repentance. The difference between
the two perspectives may seem slight-indeed, in
either case, we find human culpability-but the
difference is significant. If we alone have gotten
ourselves into this mess, then we alone might get
ourselves out of it. If, however, God is working
against us, driving us to repentance, and if it is his
power we are up against, then we would be wise
to ask him for merciful assistance.
Indeed, not only does God drive us to repentance, but he drives us to cling to him where he
actually offers mercy, in his Son. Jesus did not
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come for the righteous but for sinners. He came
for people like us who have come up against
God's sovereignty and been crushed by it. He
came announcing forgiveness and told sinners
to start talking to God not only as the Sovereign
Lord but as their merciful Father. Where preachers show up (with their beautiful feet, as Isaiah
and Paul say), not diminishing God's sovereignty
but actually preaching Christ, there people find
a merciful God. There we can stop our delusions
about liberating God and start knowing what it
means to be liberated.
A few years ago on Ash Wednesday, I watched
with disappointment as the snow piled up outside. Ash Wednesday is one of my favorite services as a pastor, and it seemed a shame to cancel
it because of the weather. I planned to go ahead
with the service. Whoever could make it would
make it. Then I got a call from one of my parishioners who drives a school bus, the same fellow
who will only refer to rain as "the r-word." He
had put his bus in the ditch. He was serving as
council president that year and so he made the
executive decision to cancel services that night.
He made the right call. I was sad not to be able
to draw the ash crosses on my parishioners' foreheads that year, but God was busy drawing that
cross on my own forehead with snowdrifts. The
cross of our mortality is not just a symbol. I really
am dust. I am not able to leap over snowdrifts,
and neither are my parishioners. I am bound by
such earthly considerations as weather conditions. There is one who is unbound by such matters, the same one who binds us by bringing wind
and snow out of his treasury. He still rules, and
I thank him that the cross is not just a symbol of
my mortality but, more importantly, of his own
Son's death and resurrection, the place where his
sovereignty poured itself into mercy.
Pray for sun or pray for rain? I don't know,
but prayers for mercy are always in season.;

Paul Koch is pastor of the Wannaska Lutheran Parish
in rural northwestern Minnesota.

life together
The Year without Persimmons
Joel Kurz

F

OUR YEARS OUT OF SEMINARY ,

I

LEFT T HE CLERGY

roster and resigned my parish in Ohio.
Disenchanted with the whole enterprise
known as "the church," and convinced of the need
for a more organic, incarnational Christian existence, I embarked on a journey toward "intentional
community." I spent a few cold, wet weeks of
early summer on a northern Vermont homestead
delighting in wonder and slipping into despair.
Then, taking only what I could fit into or strap onto
my car, I headed to my parents' place in southern
Missouri ... and stayed there for the next six years.
What led me back to my parents was my
father's recent diagnosis of ALS and the onset of
his demise from dementia. That slow sojourn into
the unknown lingered with anguish yet was filled
with some of the deepest sweetness I have ever
known.
Shortly after arriving, while adapting to familiar surroundings and uncertain circumstances, I
noticed something I never had before: a spindly
persimmon tree with lopsided foliage towering
above the propane tank.
My parents had bought the place ten years
earlier, just after my father's resignation from his
dual-parish in Texas and from the clergy roster as
well- thirty years after his ordination. The son and
grandson of pastors, my father was mired in disillusionment and futility and simply could abide no
longer. His most vital and vibrant years of ministry had been the dozen he spent in the Philippines.
Toward the end of his life, he often said that coming
back to this country had been his biggest mistake.
I first encountered persimmons while trying to
adjust to this land called America after my father's
decision to leave the country where I had spent
the first seven years of my life. On a class expedition through the woods neighboring our school,
the teacher pointed to the orange orbs hanging
from the limbs of a small tree and told us they

were edible. I had grown up plucking fruit from
trees-mangoes, jackfruit, papaya, mangosteen,
and tamarind- fruit that I now longed for. I pulled
a persimmon from a limb, bit into the firm flesh,
and experienced a sourness that made me swear to
never try one again. Years later, as a ruined and disgusted pastor much sooner than my father, seeing
those green orbs heavy on the branches above the
propane tank made me desire a second chance.
Toward the end of Jesus' short-lived ministry,
just a few days before his crucifixion, he did something seemingly bizarre and erratic.
In the morning, when he returned to the
city, he was hungry. And seeing a fig tree by
the side of the road, he went to it and found
nothing at all on it but leaves. Then he said to
it, "May no fruit ever come from you again!"
And the fig tree withered at once. (Matthew
21: 18-19)
He cursed a fig tree because it had only leaves, no
fruit ... and figs weren't even in season! When Jesus
uttered those words and blasted the fig tree, he was,
I am convinced, symbolically cursing the tree of
knowledge of good and evil. When the primal pair
first became aware of their nakedness, they used
fig leaves to cover themselves-probably from the
tree by which they still stood. The rebellion which
took place at that tree was the reason Jesus journeyed to Jerusalem, the reason he himself would
all-too-soon be stripped naked and die cursed on
a tree.
Puzzling as it may seem, the cursing and withering of the fig tree has to be looked at through
Jesus' parable earlier in his ministry: the unproductive fig tree.
A man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard; and he came looking for fruit on it

and found none. So he said to the gardener,
'See here! For three years I have come looking for fruit on this fig tree, and still I find
none. Cut it down! Why should it be wasting the soil?' He replied, 'Sir, let it alone for
one more year, until I dig around it and put
manure on it. If it bears fruit next year, well
and good; but if not, you can cut it down.'
(Luke 13: 6-9)
The parable is a plea for mercy, but one with an
unsure outcome. Spared despite bearing no fruit
for three years running, the tree is given a graceperiod for intense cultivation. All will be well and
good if the tree fruits the following year, but if not,
then it will be cut down. If Jesus' cursing of the fig
tree in Matthew is crucifixion, then this parable is
the demonstration of his renewing labor on behalf
of blessing and resurrection.

M

INISTRY, AS JESUS KNEW, IS THE STRUGGLE

between blasting the fig tree out of
existence and cultivating it so that fruit
may finally come. It is a visceral and ongoing
vacillation.
Three years into his life in the Philippines,
my father sat looking out on the endless sea and
wrote vividly damning and beautiful sketches of
the people and events that filled his childhood as
a pastor's son in rural Illinois. It was as though he
needed the distance of time and place and culture
to see and discern the truths of those memories.
But his understanding was not confined to the surroundings of his distant past; he looked with equal
clarity of vision on the tragedies and truths of the
people in his present world, so different yet so
commonly human. Whether in the rural Midwest
or in the Far East, the universals of human experience were what he learned to define: pride and
shame, possession and loss, hypocrisy and reverence, sadness and joy, cruelty and redemption.
I found those sketches, which my father had
written three years prior to my birth, while tending
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to his withering frame ... while dealing with the
dissipation of his once keen mind and the gracious
disappearance of the bitterness that had gripped
him for so long.
Late each autumn during those years of my
father's demise, I took great counsel from that old
persimmon tree with branches way out of reach.
I learned that one has to wait for persimmons to
drop when ripe. The fruit, soft and fragile, looking
like the rising or setting sun dusted with a gentle
white haze, falls to the ground and awaits discovery as a gift from above. The flesh of ripe persimmons, readily reducible to mush, is faintly sweet
and beckons wildlife. I was always mindful while
gathering the fallen fruit to share the abundance
with those nocturnal gleaners. I could preach with
ease a sermon to the birds (and people) on the
virtues of persimmons; about waiting and being
given, about bitter turning to sweet.
My father died a year ago this past Decemberfive months after I returned to parish ministry. In
the late spring of that year, a hard freeze carne and
damaged many a crop. The persimmon tree bore
no fruit that fall, and my visits horne were devoid
of that sensory solace. But that year gave way to
another.
Persimmons fell in abundance once again this
past autumn. I savored their pleasant sweetness
even more due to the year's absence, thinking of life
and death and a calling abandoned and restored.
That tree calls me to remember barrenness and
anticipate resurrection. I can look at a cursed and
withered tree, even a beam with the Son of God
hanging on it, and see the tree of life. 'f

Joel Kurz received his BA in English from The College
of the Ozarks and his MDiv from Concordia Theological
Seminary. His essays and poetry have been published in
several journals.

being lutheran
God's Justice in the World
Nicholas Hopman

L

IBERATION THEOLOGY HAS BECOME A POWERFUL

force in many mainline Protestant
denominations. This teaching claims that
God "does justice" by bringing an end to unjust
systems that provide power for "oppressors"
at the expense of the "oppressed" (see Houston
2008). Conservative American Evangelicals tend
to understand justice in a more personal way.
Their piety is personal and more religious in the
traditional sense. It is a piety about "Jesus and
me." They define being a good Christian as being a
just person, but here justice is located primarily in
the church and the family rather than in massive
sociological and international systems.
Lutheran theology allows one to enter into
this discussion about justice without choosing
sides. Lutherans should sense that there are some
theological problems with the liberationists "justice" meta-narrative. Lutherans confess the doctrine of original sin. The doctrine of original sin
tells us that the distinctions between the poor and
the rich or the oppressed and the oppressors are
merely penultimate. Before God "there is no distinction, since all have sinned and fall short of the
glory of God" (Romans 3:22-23). All are sinners.
On the judgment day of Jesus Christ, the poor
and oppressed too will have to answer for their
sins alongside their oppressors.
While Liberation theology is all about justice,
we Lutherans also have justice at the center of
our theology. Perhaps the central passage of all
Lutheran theology and all scripture is the third
chapter of Romans. It states:
But now, apart from law, the righteousness
of God has been disclosed, and is attested
by the law and the prophets, the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for
all who believe. For there is no distinction,

since all have sinned and fall short of the
glory of God; they are now justified by his
grace as a gift, through the redemption that
is in Christ Jesus, whom God displayed as
a mercy seat, effective by faith in his blood.
He did this to show his righteousness,
because in his divine forbearance he had
passed over the sins previously committed; it was to prove at the present time that
he himself is righteous and that he justifies
the one who has faith in Jesus.
Luther claimed that his breakthrough came when
he understood the term "the righteousness of
God," as used by Paul in Romans. He saw that
the righteousness of God is the righteousness
by which God makes us righteous. Out of this
insight bloomed the Lutheran dogma of justification by faith.
The New Testament Greek word for "righteousness" is dikaiosune. The Old Testament
Hebrew word for "righteousness," which stands
behind the New Testament understanding of righteousness, is tsadaq. Both these words and concepts can be translated either as "righteousness" or
"justice." This is also true of the Vulgate's "iustitia
Dei" (righteousness/justice of God), through which
Luther learned this concept. These were also the
actual words Luther used in the preface to his Latin
writings, in which he described his Reformation
breakthrough. The Luther Bible's "Gerechtigkeit"
works the same way. It can be translated as "righteousness" or "justice." The traditional rendering
of Luther's "iustitia" as "righteousness" is simply
the translators' preference. The choice of the word
"justice" is not necessarily a better translation than
"righteousness," but in the current theological climate, filled with claims about "justice," it should
be remembered that the Apostle Paul had his own

claim about justice and this claim is at the heart of
Those justified by faith are free to serve their
Lutheranism. As we read in Romans, God is estabneighbors. Although the world is no longer a stage
lishing a new "justice ... apart from law." A justice
for utopian schemes for justifying ourselves, justification by faith frees our created nature, and with
based on faith in the mercy of Christ's blood.
it our reason, to think of how to help our neighRomans 3 shows us that if we define God's
bors. And on this level, we must be thankful for
justice as liberation theologians do, then God has
Liberation theology. The Liberationists have shown
a credibility problem, i.e. we cannot have faith in
him. Why? He has "passed over sins." Because
us that sin does not take place merely in the realm
he has not delivered the justice the oppressors
of personal responsibility and acts but is also sysdeserve and liberated the oppressed. God's wrath
temic. Merely by trying to do the right thing and
and punishment do not work like human juslive our normal daily lives, we take part in these
tice. He does not hand out
systemic sins. This is perfectly consistent with the
punishment in accordance
Lutheran claim that sin is
with the transgression as
We do not participate in God's
a power that rules over us
human law attempts to do
and we are unable to free
(See Elert 40-43). God as a
justice simply by being (~ood
ourselves from it.
Liberationist is a failure.
In this way, liberation
Christians" who fulfill familial
theology
is more biblical
o HOW DOES Goo
and
local
obligations.
Instead
demonstrate his justhan what I call AmericanEvangelical
theology.
tice? "He justifies the
God's justice is to make us
American Evangelicalism
one who has faith in Jesus."
reads Romans 3 as a claim
This is a strange justice. It
just/righteous by faith alone.
that we do not have to do
is the justice of faith alone
We
are
then
free
to
serve
our
apart from works. It is
any good works before God
to be justified save "accepta justice that comes not
neighbors with our works.
from our works or even
ing Jesus Christ as your
personal Lord and Savior."
from our attempts to end
oppression. Instead, it
This accounts for the inhercomes "by his grace as a gift, through the redempently personal piety of conservative American
tion that is in Christ Jesus, whom God displayed
Christianity. Liberation theology is a good antidote
to such thinking.
as a mercy seat, effective by faith in his blood."
This is a mercy not equated with a worldly goal
God does not like pietists who spend all their
time examining their own hearts trying to figure
but with the blood of Christ shed to forgive "all,"
who "have sinned and fall short of the glory of
out how things are "between me and Jesus." He
God."
wants faith in his Son, which takes us outside of
ourselves into Christ. We do not participate in
The world knows not this justice. Liberation
God's justice by being "good Christians" who fultheologians suspect this justice as being an excuse
fill familial and local obligations. Instead, God's
for the status quo. However, justification or being
justice is to make us just/righteous by faith alone.
made righteous or just by faith alone is not a
We are then free to serve our neighbors with our
master form of status quo politics. God's word of
liberation from death and sin is the most revoluworks. Small acts of kindness and dealing justly
with those we come into contact with on a daily
tionary thing on earth. Robespierre, Washington,
basis are very important. Here conservatives can
Lenin, and all other worldly revolutionaries
remind us that all ethics, even fighting against sysmerely rearranged the deck chairs on the Titanic
tems, always begin on the personal level among
compared to this. God is making a new creation
individuals and that it is much harder to help the
with his justifying word and creating new life that
poor person in your neighborhood, church, or
no oppressor can ever take away.

S
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family than to be in favor of helping "the poor."
However, we can hardly claim to be fighting
against the devil if we do not think big.
For example, big sins of government and rich
institutions that have benefited many average
people are today threatening the very stability of
our society. Is it right to permanently indebt our
children in an effort to prop-up the value of houses
we paid too much for and in many cases could not
afford? Was it right to expect 12 percent returns
from the stock market for 401k plans every year?
Is an economy based on credit just? Why are the
rich bankers "too big to fail" but Mom and Pop
stores are expendable? Sometimes conservative
evangelicals can help us ask such questions also.
For example, is it just that our nation kills millions
of unborn children every year?
By correctly preaching God's justice as defined
by Romans 3, Lutherans announce the forgiveness
of sins and eternal life. This in turn frees people
for true life in this world. In this freedom, we use
our reason to unmask evil in the world. We create as much human justice as we can. We are not
bound to particular political agendas but are free
to use true insights from wherever they come. If
there is any hope for American Christianity, it is

the apostolic and catholic doctrine of justification
by faith alone. The Evangelical-Lutheran churches
have this doctrine at their core. It is a way forward out of the liberal-conservative debate, even
if many would rather reject God's righteousness
and justice in an effort to keep their own fictitious
righteousness and justice. f

Nicholas Hopman is Pastor of First Lutheran Church

in Dollar Bay, Michigan and Grace Lutheran Church
in South Range, Michigan. He is a recent graduate of
Luther Seminary and is beginning graduate studies at
Concordia Seminary in Saint Louis.
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PERTHI
Perthi Sheep Farm, Beddgelert
England's flooded. Here, too, it's been too wet
for shearing. Long wool shedding the rain, ewes
graze the fields; lambs the color of cloud
butt and punch at the udder. Our own coats
drip in the hall as we sit and gaze
through the picture window, taking in
the grey-green landscape, the confluence of earth
and sky that bore us, beauty we crave like milk.

Daniel Polikoff

pop culture
On Leonard Cohen
The Holy or the Broken Hallelujah
Christian Scharen

D

URING A TWO-WEEK MEDIA BLITZ TOUR OF

the United States in support of their new
album, U2's lead singer Bono was asked
which song by another artist he wished he'd written himself. Without hesitation he said Leonard
Cohen's "Hallelujah," a song he described as
"extraordinary." Laboriously written over years
and released on his 1984 album Various Positions,
"Hallelujah" has become one of the most famous
pop songs ever with more than 150 cover versions,
some as popular as Cohen's own. (Jeff Buckley's
version is of particular merit.)
Currently on a North American tour at the
age of seventy-four, Cohen has been on the music
scene for more than forty years. A Canadian
poet, novelist, and singer-songwriter, Cohen has
achieved the pinnacle of his art, receiving accolades for both his music and his writing. Many of
his songs bear religious themes that echo his long
immersion in Jewish thought and Scripture study.
As a child, he spent long hours at the side of his
Rabbi grandfather studying sacred writ, with
the Prophet Isaiah emerging as his favorite. His
appeal has to do largely with his willingness to
articulate beautifully his own seeking-of God, of
truth, of the pleasures of life, and of his own struggles with depression and loss. What many find in
his writing is an authentic voice helping them to
speak of their own holy and broken lives.
Of all Cohen's songs, only this one is larger
than life-a literal pop culture icon. "Hallelujah"
is the kind of song that seems as if it has always
been written. Of course that is partly because its
main theme, the chorus "hallelujah," has indeed
"always" been written. It is the ancient Hebrew
word "V??1;r1" meaning "praise God" and is found
over and over in the Psalms. It also strikes a chord
because of the interplay of the music and lyrics.
The song rewards careful reading. Three versions
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exist: Cohen's album version, a live version from
his tour in support of his seventh album Various
Positions, which includes a couple new verses, and
a compilation version first sung by John Cale (The
Velvet Underground) in 1991 that combines the
two versions Cohen himself has sung.
This song, and Cohen's work generally, provide the jumping off point for a book I'm currently writing on theology and pop culture. It has
the working title, Broken Hallelujah: Pop Culture,
Imagination and God. I draw on Cohen, and especially this song, for a few reasons. First, it is
important to me that it is not a "Christian" song.
It is, first of all, a pop song with immense and
broad appeal-so much so that it was even used
in the wildly popular animated family film Shrek.
Second, it does have a particular religious depth,
drawing on Biblical references. The song begins
with a reference to King David, well known both
as a musical genius and a womanizer, and also
alludes to Samson and the Exodus, where Moses
learns "the name" of God. Third, however, it is
not "just" a biblical song but one that draws from
those roots to speak about both the power of the
Holy and the brokenness of human life.
The song begins with David but moves progressively out of the Bible and into the challenges
of daily life. The last verse speaks to the challenge
of living. A deep humility about human goodness
comes through as Cohen sings, "I did my best,
it wasn't much." Perhaps this is easier to say in
Canada, but in eternally optimistic USA where
pastor Joel Osteen's Your Best Life Now became
a best seller, such sentiment is often dismissed
as misguided-a downer, at best, and at worst
unfaithful. Theologically, however, I think Cohen
is spot on; his lyrics get what a faithful life means.
In this life, all we are capable of is a broken hallelujah. We're only able to raise a broken hallelujah

because of what God has done for us. Knowing
that keeps us from trying to please God with our
shiny "holy hallelujahs" and allows us to be honest about ourselves, our need for God's mercy,
and our call to join in God's mission of mercy in
the midst of a broken world.

Broken Hallelujah as Theological Perspective
It bears a bit further unpacking if I am to make
the case for how I draw upon the song "Hallelujah"
and especially this phrase, "Broken Hallelujah,"
for thinking about pop culture in relation to faith.
"Broken Hallelujah" offers a wonderfully poetic
shorthand, a way into
a fundamental view of
human life as a broken
reality, broken beyond
our ability to fix. The
Christian term for this
is "sin"- a concept that
many people today see
as an antiquated and
unenlightened
idea.
However, that cultural
shrug in response to the
idea of sin usually is a
reaction to the idea of
sin as "sins." The shrug
throws off the presumed
legacy of a medieval
and
psychologically
damaging introspection
in relation to sinful acts and impulses which modern liberated society now knows are actually normal. Like: sex is not "epilepsy" or the "influence
of the devil"- it is created by God as good, and
psychology and biology tells us it is supposed to
feel good. Or: alcohol is not the "devil's drink" wine, for instance, is the beverage of the feast, and
medical research tells us that in moderation it has
numerous health benefits.
While some Christians focus narrowly on
these sorts of issues (e.g., code morality regarding
things like the sinfulness of having sex or drinking alcohol), such questionably bad acts are not
what I mean when I speak of human life as broken. What I actually mean to say is that we are broken to the core. The Christian tradition sometimes

calls this by a Latin phrase: incurvatus in se. The
term literally means "the self curved in on itself."
In common parlance we call it "navel gazing." I
love the phrase because it so directly points to
the human fault. It reminds me of the joke: "Well,
enough about me. What do you think about me?"
Add to this, then, an over-optimistic sense that we
can work out some spiritual peace for ourselves
(through Yoga or "just being a good person" or
even by attending church). We end up with this:
sins are bad acts, and if we just act better we can
feel good about our relation to God and to others
in our daily lives. It's a view encapsulated in the
1970s therapy slogan,
"I'm okay, your okay."
Cohen's song, however, is grounded in
another view of life. A
way to read Cohen's
meaning is that we
want to pretend that we
have a "holy hallelujah"
to offer God when actually all we ever have is
a broken hallelujah. The
Christian story is that
through the gift of Jesus
Christ we are judged
fairly, seen for what
we are (navel gazers,
every one of us), and
despite it all, forgiven.
That gift of God's holiness, through Christ, gives
us a "holy hallelujah" to sing even if our lives are
always "broken." We share in something "unbroken" if you will. Cohen gets at this beautifully in
his portrayal of the one who, despite it all, is able
to "stand before the Lord of Song" with "nothing
on my lips but Hallelujah," a circumstance that
implies something like the Seraph putting the hot
coal on Isaiah's lips. It is a way of saying that God
gives us a standing we do not earn, and a purity
that is not from us, even as it begins to draw us
into becoming what we were intended to be and
will be in the end.
Living in this mixed state, with unclean lips
yet bearing the gift of God's purifying touch on
our lips, points to another classic Latin phrase:

simul justus et peccator. We are by birth joined to
a sinful world, and as sinful creatures, we are
simply "peccator," that is, sinners through and
through. That means we seek ourselves even in
doing good; we presume that we are good, worthy, and righteous because of our own good acts.
Or, more likely, we just love our selves and our
pleasures so much that we don't really care either
about other people or about doing good. Britney
Spears's recent anthem, recorded and released
in the midst of her personal flame-out, is ironically titled "Gimme More." It is not that I think
Ms. Spears or anyone else needs to find Jesus and
thereafter only sing songs of glory in the narrow
sense. People who sing only hymns or explicitly
spiritual songs often are those who feel the need

either to earn or prove their salvation through
good behavior. No, instead when we find ourselves confronted by the accusing judgment of
God, and give up, literally, by dying to ourselves
and being "born anew," then we can begin to
live out of a "justus," that is, a right-ness that is
not one's own but given. Then we can sing, with
Cohen, "and even though it all went wrong I I'll
stand before the Lord of Song I with nothing on
my lips but Hallelujah." f

Christian Scharen is Assistant Professor of Worship

at Luther Seminary, St. Paul, Minnesota. He is currently writing Broken Hallelujahs: Pop Culture,
Imagination and God (Brazos Press 2009).

NO SIGN
No rain
has fallen
from forty day
gray sky.
No ark
rises on
the flood of
its absence to
the top of a mountain.
No sign of peace today.

Steven Schroeder
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nation
Good-News Days
David Lott
'C

AN YOU TELL ME WHERE 'THE VOTIN' PLACE IS?"

The simple question from the tall, wearylooking, slightly disheveled African
American man took me off-guard that Tuesday
morning. As he approached me on the street as
I was returning horne from casting my ballot, I
braced myself to be hit up for a hand-out. Instead,
as I looked into his tired eyes and heard his slightly
slurred voice, it hit me that this was one thirsty
man asking someone who clearly had access to the
well where he could find water. I pointed him in
the direction of the junior high school that served
as our local polling place, but even as he went on
his way, he stayed with me all day.
Perhaps it was the contrast he provided to
what I had witnessed earlier as I walked into the
schoolyard gates to join my fellow voters, a line of
about twenty people of all ages and races standing outside the school patiently waiting to enter. A
well-dressed white woman pulled up to the gate
in her shiny new SUV and asked to park on the
school grounds so she could run in and out quickly
to cast her vote. The people at the gate explained
that parking there was reserved only for poll
workers and school personnel but that she could
park for free on the other side of the narrow, oneway street. Looking at the economically distressed
neighborhood and the (briskly moving) line, she
announced that she couldn't possibly do that and
that she would just have to forgo voting this year,
and then she went on her way.
Granted, the immediate surroundings of
this particular school are not the finest that
Washington, DC has to offer. It is certainly less
"gentrified" than my own Lincoln Park neighborhood, five blocks away, and it has far fewer services and businesses to offer its residents. Drug
violence and street crime are also more common
here, but certainly neither she nor her vehicle

were in any danger, particularly on Election Day.
Many of the folks who live there look more like
the man I met on the way out than like me or this
woman who chose not to vote out of fear for her
Lexus and the "inconvenience" she might have to
endure-such as standing in line for a few minutes with the mixed-race couple who were bringing their toddler son into the polls to see what
Americans do on the first Tuesday in November
every four years.
Of course, I don't really know what was in
her heart or mind or Blackberry that day, nor do
I know the story of the man who approached me
on the street. I do know, however, that when the
TV networks announced at 11 PM Eastern time that
Barack Obarna had been elected president of the
United States, millions of Americans felt that they
had found the water they had long been seeking.

M

ANY OF THE MILESTONE DAYS WE REMEMBER

over the past century are those marked
by violence and tragedy: the assassinations of JFK, RFK, and MLK; Pearl Harbor; the
stock market crash of 1929; the onset of the Gulf
and Iraq Wars. These days stick with us, not only
because of the immediate traumas but also for the
long-lasting impacts on our common life. 9/11/01
is perhaps even more of a terrible and ambiguous touchstone than it might otherwise have been,
because it spawned not only two wars, but also
intense battles over privacy, torture, and military
interventionism.
Many of the "good-news" days, by contrast,
such as the first man walking on the moon or the
nation's Bicentennial, are inspiring but seem to
carry less emotional weight. They have less obviously enduring effects on our national psyche and
are not necessarily transforrnative, for good or ill.
The election and inauguration of Barack Obarna

seems to mark the end of the legacy of 9/11-if
not an immediate end to the ongoing effects of the
Bush administration's policies, necessarily, then to
the political mind-set that nurtured, and even celebrated, the undermining of national values and
human decency. In many ways, these events have
felt like the "anti-9/11." The dates of 11/04/08 and
of 1/20/09 may not stick in the mind like 9/11 , but
they have the potential to be remembered as the
first good-news days in a long time, days that have
effects as lasting as those of other, bad-news days.
Like many others, I am still haunted by memories of the emptiness of Washington's streets that
day when I walked a long five miles home through
the heart of the city-empty except for police and
military personnel. On a beautiful day, people
holed up in their homes in fear, glued to their televisions, filled with anger, grief, and tension. By
contrast, on 11/04/08, masses of Washingtonians
poured out into the streets, gathering at the White
House and overtaking the area around 14th and
U Streets NW- home to what was once known as
the nation's "black Broadway" -an area only lately
coming back from the post-King assassination riots.
And on 1/20/09, nearly 1.8 million people from
all over the country gathered on the Washington
National Mall to witness Barack Obama take the
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oath of office-free from fear, free to rejoice rather
than cowed by dire pronouncements or lulled by
anodyne exhortations to go shopping.
As momentous, exciting, and extraordinary
as Obama's inauguration has been, perhaps the
greater meaning of this day is that such an occasion will never again need to be so important. Over
the next four years, as we become accustomed to
seeing President Obama carrying out the duties
of his office-meeting with world leaders, presiding over national celebrations, comforting citizens
in tragedy, and confronting national and international crises -the racial significance of the inaugural events, which is still so fresh and great, will
gradually fade. And that's good news. There are
still other barriers yet to be broken- for women,
for Asians, for Latinos, for sexual minorities, and
others-but with this inauguration we again were
reminded that these barriers can be broken.
Nevertheless, we do rejoice in this inauguration, and, if you are like me, your eyes well up
with each new story of a person who experienced
or witnessed racial discrimination and now finds
some redeeming power in Obama's ascendance
to the presidency. Reverend Joseph Lowery said it
best in his inaugural benediction, when he quoted
from James Weldon Johnson's "Lift Every Voice

and Sing"-though I think the most apt part may
be from the verse he did not cite:

Yet, with a steady beat
Have not our weary feet
Come to the place for which our parents sighed?

I

N

COMMEMORATING

THESE

GOOD-NEWS

DAYS,

Christians need to remember what the "real"
good news comprises: good news to the poor,
release to the captives, the blind recovering sight,
letting the oppressed go free. That is not something
that Barack Obama or any other politician can do.
But with our words and our service we can hold
our country accountable for policies which assure
that the good news announced in this momentous election and inauguration also translates into
those biblical marks of the good news coming to
pass among us and in the world.
Most immediately, that means paying attention
to how we conduct ourselves in the midst of our
world economic crisis. With the various financial
and housing market bailouts and economic stimulus packages, there has been not a small amount
of loud protests from people and "experts" wondering why they, the "responsible" ones, should
have to help those who did not behave so well.

The temptations to meanness and lack of charity
are certainly rife, and these are surely being stoked
by talk radio, the blogosphere, and other media
sources. Indeed, some make it seem that scorning,
if not punishing, these who are now characterized
as "the least among us" is our patriotic duty and
what we owe future generations. And even when
punitive measures are taken off the menu, it's all
too easy to back away in fear, or turn our heads in
denial, or just say, "It's not worth it."
The temptation is always before us to pull up
to the gate and decide the risk or inconvenience is
too much. But, as Martin Luther said, "We are all
mere beggars asking other beggars where to find
bread." Or water. Or refuge.
Or, "Can you tell me where the votin' place is?" f

David Lott has been a religious book editor for over
twenty years, has worked with Fortress Press and the
Alban Institute, and is editor for the lectionary aids
series New Proclamation. A graduate of St. Olaf
College and Luther Seminary, he lives in Washington,
DC where he does freelance editing and writing.

law
Why the Court Should Be Packed
]ames Brand

P

RESIDENT FRANKLIN RoOSEVELT CAME CLEAN

with Fireside Chat No. 9; he admitted that
the Judiciary Reorganization Bill of 1937
was the "court packing" plan everyone knew it to
be. He had presented the bill, which would have
allowed him to appoint an additional justice to the
Supreme Court for every justice over seventy years
old, as necessary to allow the elderly and overworked judiciary to handle its case load. When this
subterfuge was met with skepticism across the ideological spectrum, President Roosevelt attempted
to impress upon the nation the critical need for the
Court to support legislation increasing the role of
the federal government in economic matters. The
United States had just pulled itself out of an economic crisis and the Court was striking down the
very solutions that the voters had approved overwhelmingly. Congress and the President needed to
take action to save the Court from itself and the
nation from the Court.
Even viewed from today, in an era of expanding
executive power, Fireside Chat No.9 is a breathtakingly direct assault on a coordinate branch of the
federal government.
Many people believe our current economic crisis finds its nearest American analog in the 1930s,
and President Obama is said to face challenges similar to those confronting President Roosevelt. Perhaps it is not surprising that some commentators
are calling for a modern-day court-packing scheme.
But what is surprising is that they are right-and it
has nothing to do with the economy, the ideological drift of the Court, or the current occupant of the
White House.
At least two Supreme Court justices are expected to step down during President Obama's
first term. When they do, choosing their replacements will spark fierce political battles. And no
wonder, considering that each new justice will be
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a powerful political actor who will have almost
no external accountability and who could retain
office for decades.
The observation that Supreme Court appointments are highly political is nothing new. Just look
to Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal (Oxford
2005) for a thorough analysis of the wide range of
political forces at work in the appointment process
(and a less-than-satisfying account of how political
forces affect actual decisions). In this quick read,
Epstein and Segal cover a lot of ground around the
simple point that judges are political actors. One
is never quite sure whether this is a premise or a
conclusion, but the ground they cover is fascinating nonetheless. The authors draw on an array of
examples to illustrate the political considerations
facing the relevant actors-the President, Senators, political parties, legal organizations, interest
groups, the appointees themselves-and how these
considerations bump up against each other in the
process of selecting new justices.
Of course the process is political. It is, in fact, a
part of our political system. But Epstein and Segal
go further; they provide evidence that individual
justices make decisions within a fairly predictable
range on the usual conservative/liberal spectrum.
We know this, too. The authors steal their own
thunder by quoting newspaper editorials from
throughout our history making the obvious connection between the political inclinations of the justices and the policy implications of their decisions.
There are still many interesting questions to be
asked regarding the effects of ideology on decisionmaking. Recent scholarship-more in the realm of
behavioral science than political science or lawhas been yielding intriguing puzzles. Are Judges Political? (Brookings 2006), written by Harvard Law
School professor Cass Sunstein (who has been ap-

pointed by President Obama to head the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs) and others,
looks at how a judge's decisions are affected by
other judges' ideologies. Drawing on a large body
of decisions by three-judge appellate panels, they
find evidence of a "panel effect" -a tempering or
amplification of a particular judge's expected vote
depending on the ideologies of the other two judges. There are many potential explanations for this
phenomenon, but I raise it to make the same simple
point that Epstein and Segal seek to make: Who we
pick as judges actually matters.
Although we may not fully understand the
"why," we recognize the importance of an appointee's outlook, and we try to predict an appointee's
future behavior by inquiries into past behavior, exhaustive interviews, and ideological litmus tests.
And then the seemingly intractable battles begin.
The stakes are high, and they are getting higher. Although Epstein and Segal contend that these
political considerations have not changed- politics
are politics-they admit that the landscape certainly has changed. There has been a marked increase
in press attention to the appointment process, with
national papers running multiple-page spreads on
potential appointees when a vacancy is on the horizon. Add to this the increased involvement of media-savvy interest groups, and the amplified media
coverage gets vitriolic.
This increases the risk for political actors. As
the public becomes more aware of the choices, and
those choices take on ideological overtones, politicians must be cognizant of how the public perceives
their stance with respect to the appointees. So in
addition to being a very important battle for a very
powerful office, judicial nominations become proxy
wars for other ideological and partisan battles.
But the stakes don't need to be this high.
A group of legal experts from across the political spectrum recently sent four proposals to
Washington, urging reform of the judicial branch.*
Although the Third Branch was created by the
Constitution, its actual composition and structure
was first articulated by the Judicial Act of 1789 and
remains within the control of Congress.
One of these proposals suggests regular appointments of new justices to the Supreme Court.
Every two years, a new justice would be appointed.

To get around the Constitutional requirement of life
tenure for judges, the proposal envisions a continuing but diminished role for justices who don't retire
when their spot comes up for re-appointment.
The experts who are advancing this proposal
want to keep the High Court fresh- to make sure
that "the Court's many important policy decisions
will reflect the moral and political values of the
contemporary citizens they govern." While this rationale smacks of results-oriented overreaching like
President Roosevelt's, regular appointments would
have the beneficial effect of lowering the stakes.
This is a move in the right direction, but eighteen
years on the Supreme Court followed by "a continuing but diminished role" is still a big deal; the
stakes would be lower, but materially so?
This proposal could be effective if combined
with an increase in the size of the Supreme Court,
diluting individual votes and complicating the
overly binary distinctions between party appointments. This would not decrease the importance of
the Supreme Court. Unlike President Roosevelt, I
am not advocating a "rebalancing" of the branches
of government. Rather, I am suggesting that we
decrease the importance of any particular justice
so that potential compromises are allowed room
to develop and the appointment process becomes
less of a proxy war for general ideological disagreements.
In order to succeed, such a proposal would
need a built-in time delay. This would demonstrate
to the minority party that this is not an opportunistic subterfuge like President Roosevelt's "old age"
yam. Behind a veil of ignorance regarding who
would immediately benefit from additional appointments, a debate over the long-term merits of a
larger court and regular appointments might have
a chance of moving us in the right direction. f

James Brand studied law at the University of Chicago.

He currently practices in Minneapolis.

* A copy of the proposal for reform of the judiciary dis-

cussed in this column can be accessed at: http://paulcarrington.com/Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act.htrn.
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Richard John Neuhaus, 1936-2009
James Nuechterlein

T

HE

DEATH

NOTICES

FOR

MY

FRIEND

AND

colleague Richard John Neuhaus, who
succumbed to cancer on 8 January at age
seventy-two,allemphasizedthetwogreattransitions
in his life: in politics from Left to Right and in
religious affiliation from Lutheran to Catholic. Most
of what was written about
the two moves was more
or less accurate, but there is
more, I think, to be said about
both of them, and also about
another, related, move that
has drawn little attention.
Like
most
people,
Richard emphasized the
continuities in his ideas
and beliefs. He spoke often
of the personal quadrilateral that, in his mind, had
remained steadily in place
over the decades: he always
regarded himself as theologically orthodox, culturally
conservative, politically liberal, and economically pragmatic. There was some truth
in that package, of course,
but its terms, the last two
in particular, had a certain
amount of slippage in them.
His liberalism shifted over time from collectivist to
classical-Galbraithian to Lockean in intellectual
shorthand-and there was in fact not much in common between them but the term itself. Similarly,
his pragmatism in economics flirted with socialism early in his career and wound up sympathetic
to the free market and suspicious of government
intervention.
There was, in other words, considerable discontinuity between the youthful radical and the
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mature neoconservative. Richard touched on this
briefly on occasion, but he never, to my knowledge, addressed in detail the reasons for his drift
to the Right. When pressed on the matter, he
would emphasize two things.
First, there was the Left's insistent pro-choice
position on abortion, a
stance he-rightly, in
my view-viewed as
radically
inconsistent
with its self-definition as
defender of those in society most vulnerable and
in need of protection.
For Richard, defense
of the unborn was the
overriding issue of our
time, and from first to
last he never wavered
or wearied in the prolife cause. From Roe v.
Wade onward, abortion
assumed a prominent
place in the Left-Right
divide in America, and
Richard felt himself
compelled to reconsider
his political allegiances
accordingly.
Second, he was dismayed when many of his former allies in the antiVietnam War movement refused to join with him
in condemning the tyranny imposed by the Hanoi
regime after its victory over the South in 1975.
The failure of a good part of the Left to face up to
the implications of the war's outcome led him to a
broader rethinking of Cold War issues, and by the
1980s, Richard was a strong anti-Communist committed to the formulation that, "on balance, and
considering the alternatives, the United States is a

force for good in the world." That statement may
not sound all that controversial today, but at the
time it drove many of his erstwhile friends on the
Left to distraction, and it hardened the alienation
between them.
Abortion and the aftermath of Vietnam: both
major issues, and taken together they form a plausible explanation for Richard's defection from the
Left. But that explanation has never entirely satisfied me, and I have always suspected that there
was something more involved. Which brings us
back to theology, which for Richard always took
precedence over politics.
I am not speaking here of his movement from
Lutheran to Catholic. That had nothing of politics in it. There were personal issues involved. He
was finding it increasingly difficult to sustain
within Lutheranism his dual vocation as pastor
and as public intellectual. But in the end, his was
an ecclesial decision. He had over the years come
to accept Rome's view that it was, as he so often
put it, the church of Jesus Christ most fully and
rightly ordered through time.
Acceptance of that claim had theological implications, of course, but it did not require a fundamental reordering of his theological universe.
He had always been Catholic in his sensibilitiesalready in his Lutheran years he was widely known
as Father Richard-and for him the upper-casing
of his Catholicism was more a fulfillment than a
conversion. His more astute Catholic parishioners
detected Lutheran accents in his homilies, and, in
basic theological inclination, he was always more
Augustinian than Thomist.
That is not to suggest that his decision was in
any way equivocal or anything less than wholehearted. From the time he became a Catholic, I
never heard him utter a single reservation about
the teachings of the Catholic Church on any matter whatsoever. He was as a Catholic priest what
he had never been as a Lutheran pastor: a fully
obedient servant of his church. He found in Rome
an authority to which he could happily bend his
will and in the priesthood an identity more complete than any he had known.
Becoming Catholic did not change Richard's
politics. His turn to the Right long preceded
active consideration of a journey to Rome. But

there were, I think, theological influences in the
evolution of his attitude toward political affairs.
He was always, as he claimed, "theologically
orthodox" in the sense that throughout his career
he consciously placed himself within the great
tradition of Catholic Christian belief and affirmation. He never reduced credal claims to social
ethics. But the young pastor caught up in the
1960s' crusades against war and racism supposed
a closer integration of history and eschatology
than would later be the case. He usually acknowledged the tension between "the now and the not
yet," but as late as the mid-1970s, he conceded
that his view of politics "assumes a more unified
notion of history and the salvation promised to
history" than the classic two kingdoms tradition
rooted in St. Augustine. Indeed, he went so far as
to argue in Time Toward Home (1975) that "all of
history is redemptive history or none of history
is redeemed." His provocative credo in the 1960s
insisted that "any gospel that is not social is no
gospel at all."
The moral and political certainty implicit in all
this is far removed from the sensibility that would
lead him, in his last hurrah as a Lutheran in 1990,
to urge the ELCA and the LCMS to close down
their political advocacy offices in Washington.
Critics to his Left would charge that, writing in
First Things and elsewhere as a "theocon," he simply transferred his theologically-charged moral
urgency from one side of the political spectrum to
the other. But that is not actually the case. He vigorously contended for his sociopolitical conservatism, and he obviously thought it compatible with
his religious beliefs, but he was more cautious as a
conservative in drawing direct lines between politics and theology than he had been as an advocate
of the Left.
On certain contested moral issues, abortion
preeminent among them, the imperatives of the
natural law-accessible to all people of good
will, religious or not-left little room for political
accommodation, but for the most part, Richard
was Niebuhrian in his acceptance of the moral
ambiguities of politics. (It is true, however, that
he took sometimes inordinate pleasure in pointing out to those still on the Left the susceptibility to political idolatry-and general moral

fecklessness-that he found characteristic of their
ideology. Richard's politics dropped their transcendent claims but not their combative edge.)
Richard was a complicated man, not least
in his attitude toward politics and public life.
Intensely competitive by nature, he was forever
keeping score and forever working to see his side
prevail. Yet another side of him genuinely disparaged political maneuvering and felt that preoccupation with politics tended to coarsen one's
intellectual and moral perceptions.
As he grew older, that latter perspective came to
predominate (though he never could stop keeping
score). Over the course of his career, he worked to
disinvest himself of commitment to politics. He was
proud of his achievements as a public intellectual
but took his deepest satisfaction in being a Catholic

priest. He was pleased when I told him I thought his
Lenten devotion, Death on a Friday Afternoon, the best
and most important work he had ever done. That
was the kind of writing, he said, he wanted most to
do. His repeated insistence that the Eucharistic table
was the axis mundi expressed his deepest conviction
of the truth of things. It was finally there, and not
in politics-however construed-that you changed
the world. t

James Nuechterlein,former editor of The Cresset and
First Things and former Professor of American Studies
and Political Thought at Valparaiso University, is a
senior fellow of the Institute on Religion and Public Life.

A LONG NIGHT BEFORE MORNING
GREENVILLE, ILLINOIS
Morning is in the trees in the upper garden you raised
on the rocky field and worked last summer,
and soon it will slide down the smooth alders into the pond,
waking the geese who stayed the winter with us.
From the kitchen window, I watch the old horse come up
from the fields for her carrots and oats,- and when the heat rises
shimmering and wet, I'll turn the cows into the pasture,
their bags swaying comically as they go in a line to the creek
where they will chew their cud in the cool water.
The rest of the day will go without notice, full of lists
saying to stay busy. Watch the weather, one said. Mornings will be best.
But after the last words by the new grave,
and the pressure of their bodies against me, there is still
the awful silence in the house, and a long night before morning.

J. T. Ledbetter
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Wanting to be a Slumdog Millionaire
Charles Andrews

D

URING A LECTURE ON SCREENWRITING GIVEN

at Whitworth University, Hollywood
writer-director Ron Shelton (Bull Durham,
Blaze) said that the biggest change in the movie
business since he became active in the 1980s is
the purchasing of the major studios by large,
multi-national corporations. Small, distinctively
American stories of the kind Shelton consistently
makes are much more difficult to produce in this
context, which demands high returns from overseas markets. Cinema always has been a transnational medium, and it was particularly mobile in
the pioneering days of silent films when language
barriers could be easily crossed with a change of
intertitles. But the sleeper hit Slumdog Millionaire
signals a kind of self-conscious transnationalism that may inform the aesthetic and marketing
choices of the major studios for years to come.
Slumdog Millionaire is an unlikely sort of
hybrid- an Irish director, an Indian co-director,
and cast including London-born actors like Dev
Patel, who had never been to India before filming,
distribution by Hollywood-based Fox Searchlight
studios, funding by British and American companies, and a soundtrack that includes hip-hop
songs by the Sri Lankan rapper M.I.A. As Yogi
Berra once said: "Only in America."
The film's director, Danny Boyle, cut his teeth
as a television director on shows like the Inspector
Morse mystery series, before moving to feature
films with the thriller Shallow Grave (1995) starring a young Ewan McGregor. The director and
star would go on to work together on two more
films in a row, the much heralded Trainspotting
(1996)-one of the most vibrant films of the
1990s-and the much less heralded A Life Less
Ordinary (1997), which attempted to ignite chemistry between McGregor and Cameron Diaz via a
squad of heavenly angel matchmakers.

The sappy contrivance that critics derided in
A Life Less Ordinary has become a central component of Boyle's oeuvre. Few directors seem as
capable as Boyle of jumping between flashy, gritty
projects (like the excellent blood-fest 28 Days
Later [2002]) into cheery, sincere ones (like the
earnestly Christian, family-oriented film Millions
[2004]). Prior to Slumdog Millionaire, Boyle made
Sunshine (2007), a futuristic fantasy about a crew
of astronauts attempting to reignite the dying sun.
The film was strongest in its slower, meditative
beginning which borrowed heavily from Andrei
Tarkovsky, and, in my judgment, fumbled in the
third act which played like a contrived Aliens
redux or the worst of Paul Verhoeven's Hollow
Man. The rapid shifts between the sweet (though
not quite saccharine) and the brutal (though not
quite depraved) occurs not just between Boyle's
films but within them.
Slumdog Millionaire achieves a similar feel to
Boyle's other films by mixing equal parts sweetness and brutality in a signature visual style. The
flashy editing, whip-pan camera movement, and
montages set to pulse-pounding tunes are familiar techniques from Trainspotting, and the bright
color palette recalls Millions and The Beach (2000).
Boyle's narrative draws upon the conventions of
popular Hindi cinema-colloquially known as
Bollywood-but these conventions were already
at play in his earlier films.
The film's Oscars and other prestigious
awards might tempt us to see Slumdog Millionaire
as belonging to a tradition of more serious Indian
cinema, but the parallels with Bollywood style are
readily apparent. In critical evaluations, a divide
seems to exist between India's high culture productions, whose leading figure is Satyajit Ray (The
Apu Trilogy [1955-1959], The Home and the World
[1984]), and the more popular forms that account

for the majority of movie-making in India. The
hallmarks of Bollywood movies are melodramatic
plotlines, blends of action-romance-comedypathos, long run-times, and musical sequences.
Stars in the Bollywood system dance though colorful production numbers while lip-synching to
songs sung by "playback artists," pop music stars
whose recordings may be sold
well before the film is released
and account for a major percentage of its profits.
While filmmakers like
Baz Luhrman (Moulin Rouge!
[2001]) have reached mass
audiences in American and
European
markets
with
Bollywood-inspired
films,
and some Indian filmmakers have translated their aesthetic into Western forms (as
Shekhar Kapur did with his
films Elizabeth [1998] and its
sequel The Golden Age [2007]),
attempts to create crossover
hits like Gurinder Chadha's
Bride & Prejudice (2004), starring one of Bollywood's biggest stars Aishwarya Rai, have been middling at
best. The success of Slumdog Millionaire may mark
a turning point in this trend.
Slumdog Millionaire was adapted from the novel
Q & A by Vikas Swarup, but the original structure
is borrowed from the game show Who Wants to be
a Millionaire? which originated in Britain and has
nearly a dozen international versions. At each stage
of the film, the tension ratchets up another notch
in much the same pattern as the show itself. Our
hero Jamal (Dev Patel), a street kid (or "slumdog")
with little formal education, faces impossible trivia
which he miraculously answers using knowledge
gained from his painful life in the Mumbai slums.
Each question prompts a flashback, which for the
viewer turns the narrative into a kind of guessing
game-when will the crucial detail pop into frame
and give Jamal his answer?
Though this narrative seems somewhat
mechanical, the hooks are compelling, and the characters have enough richness and texture to keep us
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attentive to them rather than to the self-consciously
nifty plotting. Jamal's relationship with his shrewd,
often-sinister brother Salim (Madhur Mittal) is complex and tortured, and the love triangle formed
among the brothers and Latika (Freida Pinto), a girl
who shares their slum life, lends greater poignancy
to the film's inevitable ending.

Most interesting is how this narrative tries to
contain the realistic horrors of India's urban poverty in conventions more fitting to light musical
theater. Some scenes, particularly those involving graphic violence toward children, are stomach-turning, yet they serve a romantic plotline
which is joyful at its core. Of course, the lives of
actual Indian poor children may include joy and
romance. In his memoir Maximum City: Bombay
Lost and Found (2004), Suketu Mehta writes: "We
tend to think of a slum as an excrescence, a community of people living in perpetual misery. What
we forget is that out of inhospitable surroundings,
the people have formed a community, and they
are as attached to its spatial geography, the social
networks they have built for themselves, the village they have re-created in the midst of the city,
as a Parisian might be to his quartier or as I was to
Nepean Sea Road" (55).
But though the film presents Mumbai slum
life as awful, there remains about it a stylized,

-

Dickensian sort of awfulness, where children
gather in gangs run by a Fagin and spurred by artful dodgers. This is not the slumdog life of Mira
Nair's Salaam Bombay! (1988) which approached
the setting with a seriousness indebted to the
Italian neo-realists of the 1940s. Poverty for Nair
(as for Rossellini, Visconti, de Sica, et al.) was
depressing and dehumanizing and could be
diminished through appropriate social action. For
these filmmakers, the cinema was a place to teach
the world about horrors unfathomable to those
outside their given conditions, and through that
teaching, real social change might be possible.
Salaam Bombay! even ends with contact information for agencies trying to alleviate the suffering
of homeless children.
Slumdog Millionaire, on the other hand, has less
didactic aims and focuses more upon the romance
of slum life which even the grittiest moments of
the film serve to amplify. Mehta's Maximum City
included unforgettable descriptions of toilets
in Mumbai, most of which overflow because of
the extraordinary population density and minimal attention to sanitation. Toilets like these play
an equally unforgettable part in one gross-out
sequence of Slumdog Millionaire, but the scene is
played more for squirms and giggles than as a
serious critique of urban administrative failure.
Likewise, the villainous crime lords who complicate the lives of our protagonists engage in vile
activities-child prostitution and torture are most
prominent- but these elements add weight to their
threat without presenting them as insurmountable
obstacles to the ultimate happiness of our leads.
And yet, for all of its backing away from serious political implications, Slumdog Millionaire
is hard to dislike, largely because of its sincere
heart. The film is undeniably a companion piece
to Boyle's Millions , an echo even heard in their
titles. Faith is central to both films, and both
similarly engage real-life horrors without flinching, yet never allow the central characters to face
serious consequences from these horrors. While
Millions pits secular, capitalist ambitions against
a socially-conscious, Roman Catholic vision of
charity, Slumdog Millionaire stages Hindu-Muslim
violence as central to Jamal's young life, and the
story is framed by his inscription within Qur'an-

--

like prophecy. Fantasies of wealth among the
working classes are also central to these films,
much as the Oscars themselves indulge a collective fantasy about watching artists gather amid
swells of wealth and fame.
In a recent segment of Charlie Rose's roundtable interview show, the film critics David
Denby and A. 0. Scott discussed the 2008
Academy Award nominees. The Academy nods,
Scott reminded us, do not reflect true merit but
rather reflect "how the Academy wants to present itself." This observation goes into a long list of
truisms about the Oscars that includes chestnuts
about the length, tackiness, and self-indulgence
of the ceremony-not to mention the fact that the
whole event is merely a commercial designed to
sell more movie tickets, DVDs, merchandise, and
designer clothes. Regarding this year's best picture winner, the cynical edge to Scott's comment
is that the Academy is not really multi-culturally
aware, aesthetically adventurous, or morally conscious but once a year merely pretends to champion all of these virtues.
At the very least, we might take heart that the
heap of awards garnered by Danny Boyle's Slumdog
Millionaire may indicate a broadening awareness
of transnational cinema. You may need to go back
as far as 1987 when Bernardo Bertolucci's The Last
Emperor won the best picture award with a largely
non-European cast to find a major Oscar winner
with this sort of cultural hybridity. At the fanciful
and fantastical core of Danny Boyle's Bollywoodinspired film is a set of tropes -love conquering
all, rags-to-riches, underdogs prevailing-that
seem to have cross-cultural appeal. To touch upon
realistic horrors without examining them, to provoke our sympathies and culminate with a neat
happy ending, to cram a movie full of cinematic
delights-these are the goals of Bollywood and
Hollywood alike, and Slumdog Millionaire is evidence of truly transnational desire. f

Charles Andrews is Assistant Professor of English at
Whitworth University.

fiaion
Wandering Roads
Joanne E. Myers
Michael Ondaalje. Divisadero. Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 2007.

A

LMOST TWO THIRDS OF THE WAY THROUGH

Michael Ondaalje's most recent novel,
Divisadero, the reader encounters a scene
in which a road that two characters are following is submerged in a river ford: "They merge,"
Ondaatje writes, "the river and the road, like two
lives, a tale told backwards and a tale told first"
(167) . This image of routes that mingle and merge
resonates in a book whose plots also flow both
forward and backward, with one of the interlocking narratives winding into and then pushing back, unfolding the others, so that-as in the
image of the crossed river and road-one's sense
of direction begins to break down. For all this resonance, the image is both curiously belated and
understated, and, as such, it is of a piece with a
novel that seems designed to frustrate rather than
fulfill a reader's expectations of what a novel will
be and will do.
Ondaatje's earlier novels often reveal a preference for mosaic, both in terms of their formal structure (in his early and experimental The
Collected Works of Billy the Kid and Coming Through
Slaughter, where snatches of dialogue, journalism,
history, and lament mingle) and in their plots,
where characters' experiences are often juxtaposed
to create jeweled, if sometimes opaque, surfaces.
Divisadero features a plot whose multiple tributaries do indeed intersect, as the image of the flooded
road suggests, though Ondaatje leaves wide open
the question of what that intersection amounts to.
In the opening pages, three almost-siblings, Anna,
Claire, and Coop, grow up under their father's
watchful eyes on a farm in Petaluma, California
in the 1970s. Their father lost his wife in childbirth
and adopted Claire a few days afterward, at the
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same hospital where Anna was born. Years later,
he takes in Coop after the boy's family is murdered. These improvised ties prove vulnerable:
Anna and Coop fall into a love affair whose discovery by the father prompts a storm of violence.
Coop is beaten almost to death, saved only when
Anna stabs her father, seriously but not fatally.
Tended briefly by Claire, Coop disappears; Anna
herself runs away. Though the novel picks up each
of their lives later, the family is, even at this early
stage in the book, definitively shattered.
When we rediscover Coop he is learning how
to become a cardsharp, sliding haphazardly into
a high-stakes life of crime. Anna resurfaces in one
of the book's other plots as-rather implausibly,
given that she disappears from Petaluma in the
cab of a stranger's tractor-trailer-a Berkeleytrained scholar with an interest in an obscure
French poet. Claire, whose story constitutes the
most definitive cul-de-sac in a book strewn with
useless specificity, works as a research assistant in
a public defender's office and spends weekends
roaming the California hills on horseback. In the
second main narrative, we follow Anna's research
in the Gers region of France into the life of the poet
Lucien Segura and her involvement with a local
man who as a boy knew Segura and whose own
history we see in passing flashes. The third narrative-as the river flows backward, the last plot
being the earliest in time-follows Segura's own
early years as a child and then a young man, lingering over an episode of almost unrequited love
and the later dissolution of his own family life.
As if that weren't enough, interspersed with
these plots the reader is offered brief glimpses
into still more lives, which are presented rather
like flashes of some complicated landscape seen
from the windows of a train. We see the delicate
labor of Lucien's mother Odile's second husband,

a clock-maker; the foreboding venality of a band
of born-again gamblers whom Coop too casually
cons; a nightmarish gallop through a forest taken
as a boy by Anna's lover, Rafael, when his horse
was spooked by an eclipse. Amongst the excess of
detail, some elements of the plots echo one another.
Sexual infidelity, freak weather, and shards of
glass link the narratives. Even motifs from other
Ondaatje novels repeat. Like The English Patient,
Divisadero features a good-hearted thief and a
night-time visit to a church. As in In the Skin of a
Lion, we see a man at work dangling from a great
height, the world made small around him.
Tracking the swirling currents of plot in
Divisadero, however, imposes too much solidity on
a text that, on the level of structure and of plot, is
about fluidity-life as Heraclitean flux or, in the
spirit of Coming Through Slaughter, jazz improvisation, the mosaic of detail arranging and rearranging itself. While Ondaatje has always been
interested in formal experimentation-even The
English Patient, perhaps the most conventional of
his novels, had to be pared of much of its poetry
to succeed as cinematic melodrama- Divisadero
bluntly whets our appetite for the satisfactions of
novelistic fullness and then yanks away our plate.
In an early sequence, Claire enters a barn to
find a horse loose and Anna injured and is then
knocked down herself. The two are only saved
by the appearance of Coop, whose confusion of
the girls' identities is dreamily noted by the semiconscious Claire. But nothing much develops out
of this sequence, just as nothing much develops
out of the early attention the novel lavishes on the
girls' relationship. In annual family photos, Anna
remembers, "One became more beautiful, or reclusive, one became more self-conscious, or anarchic.
We were revealed and betrayed by our poses"
(17). But the tensions in this relationship, though
hinted at when Claire later crosses paths with but
cannot save Coop as he descends into a shadowy
criminal world, remain unexplored. Coop's story
itself dead-ends just before the image of the road
hidden by water obtrudes into the narrative, and
the novel at that point plunges into the story of
Lucien Segura and doesn't look back. Yet even if
the novel's heart is arguably in the Segura story a romance narrative in mid-twentieth century

European countryside, a return of sorts to the
landscape of The English Patient-the denial of the
ordinary satisfactions of plot remains the same.
Divisadero echoes and shimmers with images and
bits of language that never quite assemble themselves into a whole, a patterned formlessness
with which the book seems explicitly concerned:
"the raw truth of an episode never ends," Anna
observes toward the end of the novel (267).
To the extent that Anna's passing remark comments on what, precisely, the satisfactions of plot
are, it sheds some light on what exactly Ondaatje
is doing in Divisadero. If the truth eludes closureit "never ends"-it eludes too being understood
as the product of an immaculate causality that
is plot's persistent promise: that decisions close
a circuit with results, that the present engineers
a sturdy bridge to the future. In this novel, characters find themselves across the river with no
clear sense of how they navigated the gap. They
tend to operate by whim rather than principle:
Coop, overreaching himself in a consummate con,
"looks up at the eye in the sky"-the closed-circuit casino camera that has taped his fraud- "that
he knows ... never captured what he has already
done, and waves to it" (58). It's a foolish gesture,
but the novel repeatedly honors the substitution
of gesture for action, the aestheticization rather
than the actual living of life. If such aestheticization seems profligate, it also, the book makes clear,
is faithful to the way people attempt to sublimate
the potentially dreary slog of life-of prosaic narrative-into the illumined instant of art.
Even when characters themselves elaborate
gesture into plot, moreover, the novel makes clear
that doing so is only an exercise in wish fulfillment incompatible with real life. Toward the end
of the novel, Lucien Segura transubstantiates an
imperfect real-life romance with the wife of his
neighbor into a dashing adventure series whose
publication makes his fortune. But Ondaatje's
gift here is to suggest how Segura's act is at once
vital and hopeless. "Lucien gave his readers the
happiness of a resolution," Ondaa* writes (263),
but Segura's lover is dead, and his novels' success
gives him the financial wherewithal to abandon
his own family. The satisfactions of fiction thus fit
poorly with real life but, paradoxically, are what

make that life worth living. In Divisadero, we see
characters half-aware that their lives are only a
kind of raw material of narrative, caught between
sadness and delight in the fact that the truth only
emerges as the lie of an invented plot. "[T]he terrain of my sister's life and the story of my time
with Coop are endless to me," Anna writes near the
end of the book (267). Like any novel, Divisadero
grapples with how to bound that endlessness into

a coherent form. By refusing fully to do so, and by
thus compromising the fiction of novelistic realism, it aims to remain true to the aimless, formless
beauty of real life. f

Joanne Myers is Assistant Professor of English at
Gettysburg College.

Santa Ynez Mountains
When the sky gives way to sun
it's because clouds forget themselves.
The madrone below will tell you
each thing is loved in the wind
if only we sit, listen as dusk falls.
This moment may find a hole,
branch out, grow full in the silence
if I don't look too hard.
Mule deer off the canyon trail
forage thimbleberry. Along hillsides,
in the shade of leaning alders, a run
of water draws closer to the sea,
guessing each rock on the way home.
Following could lead us anywhere.

James Lee
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Songs for the New Depression
]. D. Buhl
Hard time here and everywhere you go.
Times is harder than ever been before.

T

WO NATURAL DISASTERS FORM THE ffiSTORICAL

banks of the Mississippi Delta blues. One is
the Flood of 1927, which served as subject
matter for so many artists and marks the beginning
of record labels' interest in the area. The other is
the stock market Crash of 1929, which brought all
recording activity to an end. Between these two
events, reports Ted Gioia in Delta Blues (Norton
2008), the major record companies launched no
fewer than seventeen talent searches to Atlanta
alone, and they canvassed many cities even
closer to the Delta proper, such as Jackson and
Clarksdale, looking for African-American artists.
A sound was arising from plantation shacks and
juke joints that would change music as we know
it, yet this sound itself evades knowing. Even its
contents suggest deeper levels of experience and
conception than the surface narrative is willing to
commit to. As Gioia so memorably puts it, "the
familiar 'I woke up this morning'-the opening
phrase of so many blues songs-is never just 'I
woke up this morning."' This "submerged region"
of emotion and meaning is "the true psychological terrain of the blues."
Gioia's enjoyable book acknowledges the
many volumes of blues scholarship, advocacy,
biography, and discography that have tried to
make sense of this sound. He is in the fortunate
position of being able to weave together three marvelous epics of talent and tenacity: the mysterious
origins of pre-war Delta blues and its brief ascendancy, the musical lives of those practitioners
who made it out of the Delta, and the emergence
of the "folk blues revival" of the 1960s that reinstated many of these careers and established new
ones. This means his cast of characters is large;

the names of such researchers, writers, record collectors, and promoters as Dick Waterman, Peter
Guralnick, and Dave Evans become as important
as those of the musicians whose art they preserved and protected. There are so many adventures, in fact, unfolding simultaneously that it is
a wonder Gioia holds it all together in one very
readable narrative.
The book is not without its oversights. Gioia
takes care throughout to mention trajectories
of influence with each major blues artist, often
reminding us which rock band covered what Delta
classic, but he completely misses the Fleetwood
Mac connection when discussing Elmore James.
Thanks to guitarist/vocalist Jeremy Spencer,
"Shake Your Money Maker," "The Sun is Shining,"
and other blues number became late-1960s concert £aves in England. The fanatical Spencer even
wrote a few Elmore James songs himself!
Gioia's use of backtracking and repetition also
hangs him up, such as when he reminds readers
of the Muddy Waters-Johnny Winter partnership,
saying it originated "around the same time" as
B. B. King's breakthrough to young white audiences at the Fillmore in 1967. However, the author
already had established in an earlier chapter that
these events occurred nine years apart. 1976 is a
stretch for "around the same time."
And Gioia errs on the side of literality when
it comes to one of John Lee Hooker's greatest hits:
"Boom Boom" is not the man's contribution to
"the distinguished Delta tradition of songs about
firearms" but his best use of the shoot-down-assexual-conquest metaphor, as the lyrics make clear:

Boom, boom, boom, boom
Gonna shoot you right down
Take you in my arms
I'm in love with you

I need you right now
I don 't mean tomorrow
I mean right now.

But these are minor oversights in a fine book
filled with panoramic storytelling. Of particular
interest is Gioia's focus on how the story of the
Delta Blues was driven by a tension between the
"sacred" and the "secular." This dichotomy was
potent for many of the Delta's finest songwriters, many of whom engaged in a real-life struggle
between vocations, one to the pulpit, the other to
the stage. Son House is Gioia's favorite expression of this turmoil, and indeed the story of this
"fallen preacher" is strong stuff. But many other
players along the way questioned whether they
should pursue a career path perceived as sinful.
For a few , even touching a guitar or allowing one
in their home was a major offence to their family
or religious community. During the blues revival
of the 1960s, the same quandary arose. Some, like
the reverends Ishman Bracey and Robert Wilkins,
were satisfied; they agreed to help the young
researchers, but declined to play the blues. Any
efforts at reviving their careers would be in the
realm of gospel music or not at all. Others, such
as the great Skip James, continued to struggle, so
much so that when the cancer-seared James went
home to die in 1969 after his "second career," he
wondered if it had been that very return to the
blues that condemned him. "James promised,"
Gioia relates, "that if the Lord favored him with
a return to health, he would restrict his performances to religious songs."
ISSISSIPPI FRED McDoWELL, PERHAPS THE
best known and most loved of those
bluesmen who shot to stardom in the
1960s, carried this burden most gracefully. The
idiosyncratic bottle-neck player with the somnolent vocal style (known for saying "I don't care if
it don't sound good to you, it sounds good to me")
never recorded during the Delta's glory days.
His reputation as a guitarist, however, spread
across northern Mississippi. Gioia recounts how
McDowell's mother, before she died, asked him
to give up "the sinful instrument." McDowell
obliged and did not pick up a guitar for six years.
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"You see I got religion," he would say, "and I quit
playing." By the time researcher Alan Lomax came
upon McDowell in the late 1950s, the old bluesman had come to terms with his twofold talent,
and was in prime condition to begin a career featuring both secular and spiritual material. With
his wife Annie Mae testifying by his side, the man
who gave us the pounding "Louise" and "Shake
'Em On Down," also spread such gospel numbers
as "Keep Your Lamps Trimmed and Burnin',"
"Jesus is On the Main Line," "Amazing Grace,"
and "When I Lay My Burden Down." He contributed originals to this genre too, giving the Rolling
Stones "You Gotta Move" (Sticky Fingers , 1971),
and leaving us the lovely "Lord Have Mercy,"
recorded for Lomax in Como, Mississippi, at the
inception of his career.
The most famous story of existential gambling
in the realm of Good and Evil is that of Robert
Johnson, a tale that ends in total victory for Satan.
Accepted legend has Johnson, a nominally talented young man enamored of the more mature
playing of Son House and Willie Brown, standing
as instructed at a crossroads, waiting for a mysterious black man to appear and tune his guitar. Once
this encounter comes to pass, Robert finds himself endowed with blues power beyond that of his
idols, elders, contemporaries, and seemingly anyone who has followed in his wayward footsteps.
A Faustian bargain has taken place, of course, and
after cutting twenty-nine of the most influential
sides in music history, the rambling prodigal's
soul is repossessed when he dies at the hands of a
killer whose identity remains unknown.
Gioia does a tremendous job of deciphering
this tale. "Although the blues has been called 'the
Devil's music,"' he writes, "it has always remained
on speaking terms with the ministers of the Lord."
This essential tension is best displayed not in the
work of those who played both sides, but in a
tragic figure like Johnson, "whose life seemed to be
lived in purely secular terms, yet whose music constantly returned to the most intense, soul-haunted
themes, songs that have irrevocably shaped our
image of him as a man at the crossroads between
darkness and light."
These country blues also have shaped our
image of ourselves as men and women at that

same crossroads. Gioia writes early in his book
that "the whole spectrum of popular music
betrays the fingerprints of the blues." There are
those who will claim they hate the blues, that it is
full of cliches and self-pity. But "turn on the radio
and listen," Gioia suggests with a smile; the cliches and self-pity amidst which we comfortably
live originate from a far more authentic source.
The truth is that many people cannot handle the
blues because it is too frank, too condemning, and
tolerates no bull. Gioia's book (or any of the many
others he mentions in its course) can serve as a
sonic solvent, stripping the veneer from our lives
of complacency and self-delusion. Each musician
in the book presents a model of adaptability and
creative insistence, regardless of their bad habits.
The songs they sing can give voice to those yearnings we know not how to articulate and render
audible the howls, sighs, and screams we keep
silent. The music on our radios today has made
its own deal with the Devil. It appears to meet
this need and convinces us of its communicative
necessity, but unlike the blues it is a music of
concealment, not disclosure. Cunningly, we have
over several decades substituted for the artistry
of self-expression the artifice of self-protection, a
product Gioia's subjects would not recognized as
music. The fingerprint of the blues may still lie

upon our comfort pop, but not so as to implicate
anyone.
Leo Tolstoy's Anna Karenina provides an
unlikely illustration. With his Christian wife in
protracted labor, a house in patient upheaval all
around him, the not-yet-believing Levin compares this mayhem to that which surrounded his
brother's deathbed.
Yet that grief and this joy were alike
beyond the ordinary conditions of life;
they were openings, as it were, in that
ordinary life through which there came
glimpses of something sublime.
Openings unto the sublime. That is what the
rough and raucous songs of Charley Patton, Son
House, Skip James, and so many others appreciated in Delta Blues can be for us. Not because they
sing praises to our Lord and King but because
they give voice to the joy and grief of ordinary
life that bring him so near.

t
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to Technology. New
York: Knopf, 1992.
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to our world" (11). Even fifty
years ago, when he published
his book, Eliade was reporting
that western cultures were losing their sense of the sacred,
and he was greatly distressed
about the barbaric results that
might ensue from this loss. How
quickly the acceleration has proceeded since then.

finds it increasingly difficult
to rediscover the existential
dimensions of religious man in
the archaic societies" (13).
If Eliade is correct, and if
humans by their very nature
must seek and commune with
the sacred, perhaps it explains
the persistence with which
many Americans continue to

O ME THINGS THAT WERE FOR-

merly sacred nowadays
seem to have lost their luster.
This is a common sentiment,
as illustrated over forty years
ago in one of Bob Dylan's most
haunting lyrics. Cheap and garish goods, such as glow-in-thedark statues of Jesus, evidently
do contribute to our loss of the
sacred. But behind Dylan's critique, and this essay, is the firm
conviction that human beings
desperately need the sacred as
a centerpiece of our collective
imaginations and vocabularies. And if indeed we've badly
mangled our ability to imagine
the sacred, we better do what
we can to recover it. "He not
busy being born is busy dying,"
sang Dylan.
In his masterful study of The
Sacred and the Profane, Mircea
Eliade describes the sacred as a
primal, and a primary, human
need. We can perceive the sacred
as "the manifestation of something of a wholly different order,
a reality that does not belong
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Disillusioned words like bullets bark
As human gods aim for their mark
Made everything from toy guns that spark
To flesh-colored Christs that glow in the dark
It's easy to see without looking too far
That not much
Is really sacred.
Bob Dylan, "It's Alright, Ma (I'm Only Bleeding)"
Today, early in the twentyfirst century, it might seem
commonplace that the sacred
has been moved to the margins
of much of our so-called "secular" society. But even this bit
of "commonplace" is a recent
development. Most peoples
have believed in the sacred;
says Eliade: "the completely
profane world, the wholly
desacralized cosmos, is a recent
discovery in the history of the
human spirit. ... desacralization
pervades the entire experience
of the nonreligious societies
and... in consequence, [one]

self-identify as being "spiritual." While young people and
college students by the droves
are distancing themselves from
the organized churches, they
still have a hard time denying that built-in need for the
sacred. As a frequent teacher
of "spiritual" literature courses,
one of the major revelations
of my courses often turns out
to be the way that the quintessential ideas of the sacred
in American culture, such as
God and the universal Body of
Christ, are being systematically
eviscerated of whatever sacred

power once resided in them.
These formerly sacred symbols
are being drained of whatever
power they once might have
held. Consider the change
in public perceptions of the
church and Christianity over
the past generation. Numerous
well-publicized scandals have
rocked the hierarchy of both
the Catholic and the evangelical churches-and often these
scandals revolve around sex
with children. Furthermore,
the loud and insistent public
spokespersons of the Religious
Right have bullied their way
into partisan politics in a manner that appears to many to
be sufficiently unchristian, so
much so that it has had an ironically off-putting effect on many
of the unchurched today.
All of this bad press helps
explain why in today's America,
"spiritual" has become such a
favored term. Frequently one
hears from intelligent adults
the distinction that they are
"spiritual but not religious."
That pithy phrase has become
so conspicuous that Robert
C. Fuller used it as the title of
his influential volume discussing the phenomenon (2001).
According to Fuller, until very
recently religious and spiritual
were basically synonymous. But
now as many as 20 percent of
Americans describe themselves
without irony as "spiritual, but
not religious." The abandonment of the term religious for
self-identification apparently
refers to the speaker's skepticism toward "organized religion," even though that speaker
desires to be understood as a

person of metaphysical curiosity and even perhaps commitment. American perceptions
of religious institutions have
fallen on such hard symbolic
times that a fairly substantial number of Americans are
choosing not to self-identify as
religious anymore. "Religious"
has become a nasty word for
many Americans, and nowadays hardly any college students will describe themselves
in public as religious. It's just
too toxic an adjective.

T

HE SWIFT CHANGE IN PUBLIC

perceptions of our bedrock
religious institutions reflects a
phenomenon that the cultural
critic Neil Postman referred to
as the "Great Symbol Drain,"
which he defined in his volume
Technopoly. Postman described
symbol drain as "the trivialization of significant cultural
symbols.... Through prints,
lithographs, photographs, and
later, movies and television,
religious and national symbols
became commonplaces, breeding indifference, if not necessarily contempt" (165-6). Postman
draws upon Daniel Boorstin's
argument in his study The
Image (1984), as well as an older
argument by the Marxist critic
Walter Benjamin, to claim that
the mechanical reproduction
of images empties them of
their powers. "One picture, we
are told, is worth a thousand
words. But a thousand pictures,
especially if they are of the
same object, may not be worth
anything at all .... The extent of
symbol overload and therefore
symbol drain is unprecedented

in human history.... The constraints are so few that we may
call this a form of cultural rape,
sanctioned by an ideology that
gives boundless supremacy to
technological progress and is
indifferent to the unraveling of
tradition" (166, 170).
Postman's fiercest enemies
are the agents of advertising
and, much more pervasively,
the lords of technology in our
lives, or what he calls the lords
of "Technopoly," by which he
means the monopoly of technological powers over our culture. Much of Postman's wrath
is directed at television, as in his
famous critique of mass media
as entertainment. But Postman's
critique came years before the
emergence of the cynicism on
steroids that today's cable networks serve up, in the form of
Stephen Colbert and Bill Maher,
whose mission in life appears
to be the complete evisceration of anything that might be
considered sacred. (Postman
was under the impression that
someone as quaint as Johnny
Carson was beyond the pale,
a contrast that shows just how
far we have fallen since the
1980s.) Eliade, Postman, and I
all share a great sadness, and a
great alarm about our culture's
strange insistence on the evisceration of our most valuable
traditions and their emblems
This phenomenon of draining previously robust and useful
terms and symbols reaches well
beyond the strictly religious
realms of our culture. Consider
the change in public perceptions of the federal government
over the years. Perhaps the

American, whether left or
greatest symbol of American
right, should already know:
government is the White House
and the office of the President.
numerous shameful and sickOne of the great expressions
ening betrayals of the public
of the symbolic weight of that
trust have been thrust upon us
institution was written by Walt
from the confines of that once
sacred and hallowed place we
Whitman, a man who nearly
worshipped Abraham Lincoln.
call the White House. It is not
Whitman spent much of his
so much that scandals never
occurred in earlier timestime in the nation's capitol
during the Civil War visiting
but certainly the media were
injured Union soldiers and actnot as overpowering, and the
administrations were better at
ing as a part-time nurse of sorts.
During the course of many of
covering them up.
his days in Washington,
Whitman would drift by
the residence of the presSince Vietnam and Watergate,
ident and occasionally
news coverage has become
would even spot Lincoln
on the streets of the city.
almost omniscient if not
His romantic depiction of
completely vicious. The result
these things captures eloquently an older version
has been the drainage of
of how many Americans
prestige and honor from the
envisioned these lofty
images: "The white
symbolic pool of the presidency
portico- the palace-like,
and the White House.
tall, round columns,
spotless as snow-the
walls, also- the tender
Since Vietnam and Waterand soft moonlight, flooding
gate, news coverage has become
the pale marble ... everything so
white, so marbly pure and dazalmost omniscient if not comzling yet soft- the White House
pletely vicious. The result has
been the drainage of prestige
of future poems, and of dreams
and dramas, there in the soft
and honor from the symbolic
pool of the presidency and the
and copious moon." Whitman's
White House. Few Americans
version of the White House
today would be able to embrace
focuses precisely on its whiteWhitman's description without
ness: its purity, innocence, and
some serious reservations. In
even sinlessness.
fact, possibly the most famous
And yet, in my lifetime,
the scandals associated with
image of the White House in
the presidency have been
recent popular culture was in
the film "Independence Day."
enormous, and the media
Who can forget the shocking
coverage of those scandals
sequence of sinister aliens as
unprecedented. I only want
they deploy their mysterious
to point out what almost any
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mega-weapon and blow the
building to bits and pieces?
At least the President got out
in time, though most of his
staff were left behind. The
desire to obliterate the White
House, unfortunately, is not so
altogether alien among good
tax-paying American citizens,
sadly.

I

N

THIS

CONTEXT

WE

MIGHT

consider one of the most successful and honored prime time
network series of the new
millennium so far, The
West Wing. It was the winner of nine Emmy Awards
in its first season, the most
ever, and it featured some
of the most thought-provoking and edifying stories in recent television
memory. The idea for the
series began with the success of Rob Reiner's The
American President, a film
that captured many of
the same emotions and
which was written by
Aaron Sorkin, one of the major
writers for the series. The West
Wing featured an excellent cast,
headed by Martin Sheen as the
President, and although it was
Democratic and liberal in orientation, it often managed to
come off as somehow beyond
partisan politics. Certainly
there were issues at stake in
which the administration had
to show its left-leaning colors:
gay rights, women's rights, capital punishment, social security,
and so forth. But often The West
Wing modeled a bi-partisan
common sense approach that
thrilled its audience by being

precisely what we might hope
our government could actually
be. In this way, it managed, on
many occasions, to transcend
the partisan politics that characterize our government these
days.
In an episode about Social
Security, for example, the
administration brokers a deal
between Republicans and
Democrats and gets no recognition for the part it plays in
doing so. In another episode
about gay rights, in which a
high school boy is brutally tortured and killed by gay-bashers, the audience is tricked at
first into imagining the father
of the murdered boy as being
ashamed of his dead son. Only
later do we discover that the
father is in fact ashamed of the
abandonment of the gay community by the governmentincluding the left-leaning White
House. The function of the plot
twist is to show how regular
Americans really do care about
individual adolescents, no matter their sexual practices-and
that even politicians can be
blinded by partisan stereotypes.
The grieving father, imagined
by the Administration (and the
audience) to be some caricature of conservative homophobia because of his political
and geographic particulars, is
finally revealed to be the compassionate and caring parent
that we all should be. Another
plot development involves
the hiring of a pretty blond
Republican attorney by this
steadfastly Democratic administration. While at first she is
chastised by her colleagues,

she slowly begins to see their
value, just as her co-workers do
begin to see hers. "These people are patriots," she tells her
snide right wing friends ridiculing the White House, "and
I'm their lawyer!"
The West Wing depicted a
humane, just, and extremely
selfless White House-even
though the show did not really
pull its punches in depicting
the crude infighting, the difficult relations with the media,
and even the scandals that are
always a part of presidential
politics. The Chief of Staff is
shown to have been an alcoholic and drug addict in a previous stint as Secretary of Labor;
the Vice President is forced to
resign due to Clinton-like sexual philandering; and even the
President is depicted as having
hidden his own life-threatening illness during his election
campaign. In other words,
this was not just a rosy and
peachy kind of White House.
It was emphatically situated in
the real political world of our
day, with all its pettiness and
mindless partisanship at play.
Through it all, the President
and his trusty staff figured out
ways to m~intain an ethical
balance, serve the American
public, and believe in the ideas
at the core of America itself.
The West Wing succeeded
by drawing upon two related
American yearnings. First, it
attempted to reinvest the great
symbols of American government with the power and glory
that they previously held for
most Americans. Second, it did
this by drawing upon the very

real desire among the American
public for such a reinvestment.
In other words, The West Wing
took advantage of the American
yearning for our great symbols to be filled up again with
meaning. The West Wing was a
symptom of American shame
and disappointment about our
abandonment of what matters
most to us. In a remarkable
episode called "Shibboleth,"
the action takes place during
Thanksgiving week, and there
is much inspiring talk about our
history of religious freedoms.
Meanwhile, a ship is discovered
in San Diego carrying about a
hundred refugees from China,
who claim to be Christians
persecuted for their faith. The
President summons a representative, in order to determine the
authenticity of their faith, and
he is not disappointed. The refugee's testimony is stirring and
convincing, and the President
arranges a political solution
that both grants refuge and
allows the Chinese government
to save face. It is a moving episode celebrating the origins of
the American mythos-and it
was aired originally during the
Thanksgiving season, which
heightened its clout.
It is true that some critics
were not as glowing in their
responses to The West Wing
as my discussion here. For
example, in their volume Why
Do People Hate America? (2003),
Ziauddin Sardar and Merryl
Wyn Davies give a riveting
and at times brilliant analysis of how the program relied
upon Arab stereotypes and,
despite the show's supposed

left politics, was complicit in
the War on Terror rhetoric of
the Bush administration. And
it is worth noting how the
series often reinforces certain
kinds of stereotypes, especially of Evangelical Christians,
Republicans, and to some
extent of Arabs and Muslims.
There are other criticisms to be
made as well.
But my point here is to
focus on its positive features as
a series fostering hope among
Americans and attempting
to reclaim the symbolic possibilities of the White House.
The West Wing was most compelling when it combated the
draining of symbolic weight of
its subject and ultimately sung
the song of America. The West
Wing phenomenon is symptomatic of both the increasing
suspicion toward institutional
forces in our lifetimes, as well
as the deep yearning to recover
and act upon the sources of our
most valued ideals. In short, the
great symbols of our civilization have been taking a beating
lately, and it is most noticeable
in the public perceptions of such
crucial American institutions as
the church, the family, and the
Presidency. So is the drainage
of the symbol of our national
ideal: the White House. Overall,
the series constituted a powerful jeremiad calling America
back to its sacred ideals, and it
reminded us of what precisely
those ideals are.

P

OSTMAN'S CONCEPT OF THE

"Great Symbol Drain" is
valuable as far as it goes. But
his focus on merely the amount
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of mechanical reproduction
of images is not enough. As I
have already briefly suggested,
it is not just overexposure but
also the nature of that overexposure. Over and over, we are
shown the dark and corrupt
underbelly of things; over and
over our media bombard us
with the hideous aspects of
these symbolic institutions. We
are thus suffering from an even

America's communal
vision, once a crucial
source of hope for
our culture, has
almost died due to
the current stress on
cultural suspicion and
paranoia regarding
metanarratives.

more widespread and sinister kind of drainage. Postman
hints at this connection
between the drainage of symbols and the drainage of something much larger and much
more significant: "With the
erosion of symbols there follows a loss of narrative, which
is one of the most debilitating
consequences of Technopoly's
power.... it is certain that no
culture can flourish without
narratives of transcendent origin and power.... Symbol drain
is both a symptom and a cause
of a loss of narrative" (171, 173).
Postman recognized the loss of

faith not just in the symbols
of our civilization, but in our
mythic stories as well.
Besides the "Great Symbol
Drain," we need to understand
what I would like to call the
"Great Story Drain," by which I
am referring to the loss of faith
in narrative-driven versions of
truth in our culture. The "Great
Story Drain" follows, of course,
the standard prime directive of
postmodernism, that we now
must have "incredulity toward
metanarratives," surely one of
the most famous and puissant
three-word phrases available
to us in English today. Many
Americans today do not envision their lives as being part of
a larger story. The only story of
which they are a part is their
individual life story, and perhaps beyond that the story of
their job or their family.
A critical recognition of the
"Great Story Drain," my own
term for the loss of belief in the
power of communal stories, is
a fairly common one. America's
communal vision, once a crucial source of hope for our culture, has almost died due to
the current stress on cultural
suspicion and paranoia regarding metanarratives. Communal
hope and belief may in fact be
the chief victims of the Great
Symbol Drain that Postman
described. And the rejection
of communal vision and hope
constitutes also the rejection
of the sacred- something we
humans cannot live without.
Again I will quote from Mircea
Eliade: "the completely profane
world, the wholly desacralized
cosmos, is a recent discovery

in the history of the human
spirit.... desacralization pervades the entire experience of
the nonreligious societies and
... in consequence, [one] finds it
increasingly difficult to rediscover the existential dimensions of religious man in the
archaic societies" (13).
Difficult, says Eliade, but
not impossible. If we can
restore that vision, if we can
recover that yearning, and if we
can reassert that there is something sacred about America
and about our very lives, then
perhaps there is still a chance
that we will remember this era
not as the death of American
vision, but as an era in which
the American vision almost
died. An effort like "The West
Wing," miniscule and flawed
though it surely was, should be
applauded for its contribution
to such a project-whatever
one's particular politics might
be-if for no other reason than

Visit

that it depicts the possibility of
American vision, national consensus, and the reinvigoration
of national symbols.
In our current state of
symbol drain, such possibilities are very much needed.
Just the other day, during his
first televised news conference, President Obama was
asked by a reporter if his recent
efforts had discouraged him
from going forward with his
attempts at bipartisan legislation. This question came (with
a straight face) after only three
weeks in office! Such profane
levels of cynicism are very
hard to overcome, but Eliade
and Postman would agree that
such jadedness originates in a
depleted national imagination,
one that has largely lost touch
with the sacred (despite all
the campaign rhetoric). What
comes next-and what Eliade
and Postman are not so clear
about-are methods by which
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we might go about recovering
that sacred imagination.
The good news is that the
electorate evidently agrees .
Indeed, it may be the primary
reason for the popularity of
President Obama: his uncanny
ability to scratch an itch that
we are all feeling, in these postmodem days. We all await the
verdict of history, but given
the state of our national symbology, hope is a good thing;
maybe, even, the best thing. f
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the attic
PICASSO PAINTING GUERNICA
In Barcelona waking
to the sound of creaking
horse-drawn carts, the
sound of wood and animal
bending, aching over the
cobblestone ruts. Waking
to civilization at war
with itself, sun at noon
greased yellow

in a damp bed with bugs.
Seeing smiles of the ageing women, "broken ploughshares" he says watching
lights on the curtain
dance and blur. Product
of the life gamble
in flight
in arthritic slow motion
in mortar fire
the memory recalls whole
families swept by the
tide: moving targets.
"Like debris" he says,
watching the streetcars
pass the streetsweeper.
And at night the
flesh of lovers explodes,
forming blood bridges in
to the future ... as halfblood soldiers, saunter
the streets, move
artillery north.

Peter Brett
First published December 1979.
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